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Introduction
Evil is a seemingly insurmountable problem for theism, specifically Christian theism. As
posed in atheistic arguments, the existence of evil negates the existence of God, the creator of the
cosmos. It has been said that this problem dealt a devastating blow to theism, specifically
Christianity.1 Yet arguments continue to stream into the dialectic arena articulating new
positions, revamped language, and unique philosophies related to our changing world and
humanity. Amidst this change, the one constant is evil. In this context, the presence of evil is a
formidable stumbling block as evil is present in the world, but not a death knell as is posited by
the evidential arguments from evil (henceforth the EAE) against God. The continual engagement
between antagonists of God’s existence and Christian philosophers, theologians, and apologists
shows that this area of argument has not been closed. A simple search on various internet or
news websites depicts acts of evil in the world, including the genocide of Uyghur Muslims2 or
natural disasters.3 These are merely two examples of a wide array of evils present in the world.
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Two categories of argumentation, logical and evidential, encase these various evils. These two
categories form the schematics of argumentation for and against God’s existence.
Understanding the two main categories of arguments lays the foundation for what atheists
believe to be a staggering amount of data against God’s existence. The logical argument, taken
first, is expressed by three questions, 1) Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he
impotent, 2) Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent, 3) Is he both able and willing?
whence then is evil?4 As atheists have insisted, the initial observation of this formula poses
issues for the theist, constituting a concession to one or more of the points to alleviate the alleged
contradiction.5 This is untenable as evil exists, and God is omnipotent, omniscient, and
omnibenevolent, thus the dilemma. The logical argument has been refuted on many occasions,
with a decidedly sufficient argument coming from Plantinga,6 this argument shifts the
responsibility of evil from God to humanity. The argument from free will, a decisive refutation
of the logical problem, relieves the stress of concession to one of the three points, shifting much
of the debate to evidential evil.
Evidential evil is an encompassing title for moral evil, natural disasters, disease, famine,
divorce, suffering, or other calamities in life that yield dissatisfaction or discernable discomfort.
This area of evidential evil is the focus of this paper generally, including the argument posed by
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William Rowe from evidential evil and contemporary treatments offered by Bruce Russell.7 As it
pertains to Rowe’s essays from the EAE, the intent in this thesis is not to critique Rowe’s
argument (this has been done with enormity and success) but to look beyond the argument to the
bias (confirmation bias) or presuppositional standing of the ethos of Rowe. The argumentation is
God’s nonexistence from the platform, or derivative of no greater good observed or known, of
the justification or allowance of evil.8 It is not a refutation of the premises, per se, but instead the
biases associated with them are de facto statements of seeming certainty absent the claim of
certain knowledge. In like manner, the contemporary work of Bruce Russell, specifically the
2018 essay “The Problem of Evil and Replies to Some Important Responses,” will be critiqued in
chapter three. This critique will point to a specific bias and evaluate this bias for objective
discourse. This, then, is the heart of this thesis, the specificity of the ontology of bias as a
worldview engine as it pertains to the Problem of Evil (hereto the POE) and addressing this bias
to determine the incoherence to reality to instantiate warranted belief in God’s existence.
Statement of the Problem
Given the general to specific flow uncovered thus far, the problem lies in the bias which
undergirds the individual’s worldview as it pertains to and interacts with the POE. This
worldview is the frame of life for an individual of how they fit into what is observed, felt, and
understood, individually and in society. A worldview is an all-encompassing view of everything,
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including the individual, society, culture, emotional support, decision making, and personal and
community actions, to name a few.9 A simple definition suffices to begin the conversation but
quickly falls short in the face of the enormity of what constitutes a worldview. In this enormity
lies biases that form basic beliefs and support the worldview. Bias is the terminus a quo from
which the ethos or worldview of individuals emerges. Biases can have two definitions or may be
better defined by two functions, both of which manifest in various evidential arguments from the
POE. Psychology denotes bias as a systematic distortion in decision making and with distorted
statistical data from an unknown factor operating unaccounted for.10 A bias is also understood as
prejudice or presupposition. Prejudice “refers to the maintenance of a prior attitude irrespective
of new or contradictory information...may also refer to a predetermined favorable judgment by
which the individual ignores relevant negative information.”11 Psychology posits
presuppositions, which are assumptions about reality that have a major impact on all the
sciences.”12 The presupposition does not lie in the science but the scientist. This assumption
status is not restricted to merely scientists but to all peoples and worldviews. Presuppositions
create the basis for various beliefs.
The presuppositions that form the foundations of beliefs are often a priori. The a priori
position often causes a refusal to objectively review or accept evidence to the contrary, keeping
the original position intact or held as correct. This biased position is observed in the numerous
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arguments of the POE. What seemingly rests on linguistic changes fails to account for the basic
premise that 1) If there is an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good God, He would remove
suffering. 2) There is suffering observable in the world. 3) There is no God. There have been
many revisions to this argument which amount to changes in language that leave the premises
basically the same at the presuppositional level. The arguments from the EAE against God’s
existence have grown in complexity. This is a complexity partly cloaked in language concealing
the bias that determines “no known reason” for the allowance for the evil in the world. This bias
has been exposed in convincing refutations by Christian apologists and philosophers13 and seems
evident by the refusal to evaluate offered evidence objectively. The presupposition/bias should
be changed or altered from the revelation of contrary evidence yet fails to do so, which is the
focus of this thesis. When the specific bias or biases that produce worldviews denying God's
existence from the POE are identified and confronted with credible evidence or evidence of a
faulty, biased argument, this should cause the faulty bias to realign with the presented warranted
evidence. Isolating the bias failure in this process and offering a solution or method for
addressing the failure is the overall intent of this thesis. It is not an easy task and a position or
question that could be asked of the theist. The theistic response, I believe, would be that the
theist does look at and evaluate the atheistic evidence. It is from this evaluation that refutations
are generated. The crux lies in how the evidence stands up to scrutiny in a non-biased evaluation
that will be undertaken in chapter three. This evaluation can and should be applied to all
worldviews.

13
It is the contention here that the work of Alvin Plantinga and Stephen Wykstra have demonstrated the
bias in Rowe’s original arguments and the faulty epistemic range of the language used to defend Rowe’s position of
no known reason to justify allowing the amount of evil in the world that there is. These Roweian refutations will be
elaborated in some detail in a later chapter.
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Statement of Purpose
The faulty logic based on bias is the crux of the problem, including presuppositional
assumptions as they are intertwined and work with a bias to form the basis of belief. Rather than
only refuting another essay, the intent here is to attempt to isolate or identify the bias causing the
refusal of what is seemingly commonsense. The example can be found in a recent article written
by Bruce Russell. Russell contends on similar ground as Rowe, so the substantive elements of
the argument will not be addressed in this section. A more in-depth treatment will be handled in
the last chapter. For now, the basic contention is a known reason to allow evil in the form of
“excessive, unnecessary suffering.”14 Russell contends that because there is this level of
suffering, there is no God. The same problems that plague Rowe’s arguments appear to be here
but cloaked in language. Greater detail will be taken to engage this essay in the last chapter as
the epistemic range of suffering and the heuristics of excessive, unnecessary suffering will be
evaluated from this EAE paradigm.
The paradigms formed from beliefs rest on biases and are subject to identification. It is
important to note that identification does not necessarily transfer to justification. This endeavor
lies in the field of Cognitive Science. Cognitive Science (hereto CS) is the study of how people
think.15 Specifically, conclusions made and the formation of beliefs are the focus of CS.16 In this
arena, the problems that plague a priori belief will be studied and confronted to determine a

Bruce Russell, “The Problem of Evil and Replies to Some Important Responses,” European Journal for
Philosophy of Religion: Journal of the Central European Society for Philosophy of Religion 10, no. 3 (September 1,
2018), 106, accessed August 3, 2021, www.https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v10i3.2590.
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resolution so dialectic engagement may follow. Thus, identified biases in arguments denouncing
God’s existence can find resolution so that coherence with what is real may uproot a faulty bias
removing obstacles to belief. The true research battleground for this activity lies in a subset field
of CS known as the Cognitive Science of Religion (hereto known as CSR). This branch of CS
seeks to explain the formation, transmission, and acceptance of religious beliefs based on
cognitive function.17 This new field of study shows great promise in engaging belief mechanisms
enhancing apologetic CS and CSR.
Statement of Importance of the Problem
The importance of this thesis project lies in plowing the field for obstacles deterring
belief in God. The plowing metaphor is observed in the parable of the Sower and Soils (Mark 4).
The scattering of the seed on various soils yields results equivalent to the soil accepting the seed.
The seed cast on the roadside was eaten by the birds (Mark 4:3-4, NASB).18 The seed never had
a chance. This endeavor looks to give the seed a chance, at a minimum, by the illumination of
human finitude concerning rational thought compared to the ways of God as it pertains to the
POE and suffering. Research has uncovered similar tacts but does not explicitly address the bias
to change, remove, or lessen the impact on belief paradigms.
Two such examples are Stephen Wykstra and Francis Schaeffer. Wykstra, responding to

Saʻīd Mahdī Biyābānakī, “The Cognitive Biases of Human Mind in Accepting and Transmitting
Religious and Theological Beliefs: An Analysis Based on the Cognitive Science of Religion,” Hervormde
Teologiese Studies 76, no. 1 (2020), 1, accessed August 5, 2021. www.proquest.com%2Fscholarlyjournals%2Fcognitive-biases-human-mind-accepting%2Fdocview%2F2377841293%2Fse-2.
17
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Rowe’s argument from evil, noted the bias from the epistemic qualification of CORNEA.19
Essentially, Rowe was challenged on his statement of “does not appear” about how one obtains
knowledge about something which cannot be seen. This is a callout on a bias exhibited by Rowe
in the understanding of what can and cannot be seen and the relation to true existence in the
absence of perception. This is a clever use of epistemic acquisition or the lack thereof but did not
address the assumption that there was no apparent reason behind “does not appear.” This thesis
attempts to take on this challenge. Another example is that of “Taking the Roof Off.”
Francis Shaeffer engaged interlocutors with a strategy of “Taking the Roof Off.”20 The
essence of this strategy lies in the self-construction of a metaphoric roof, supported by walls,
which shield a man (or woman) from the reality of the world.21 This is not as much a shield from
religious belief but one from a reality opposed to the biases of humanity. Anything which
conflicts with an a priori belief is shielded by the roof. Removing the roof allows for meaningful
communication, which leads to a Gospel testimony. This approach does not penetrate the bias as
a whole but identifies it, removing communication obstacles. Both of these champions of truth
forged new ground in their approaches but, in my opinion, did not go far enough.
Per my research thus far, numerous examples of CS and CSR are available in published
text of either books and articles. As this is a new field, CSR research is in its infancy but shows
tremendous promise to engage CS to understand religious belief and unbelief better. In
juxtaposition to philosophical and apologetic treatments of the POE, there are more than can be
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counted. As these two fields could converge or combine to form a cohesive argument, my
research has not yet yielded work of this nature. Therefore, the importance of this research is
unparalleled as it would work within this specific arena, the POE, and other facets of rhetorical
engagement with Christian apologetics. Generally, addressing bias in argumentation is a
cornerstone of many, if not most apologetic engagements, regardless of the topic. Specifically,
bias undergirds beliefs and decision-making, which acts to undermine the interlocutor's intent
when given evidence that contradicts their held bias. This attempt to treat the bias rather than
refute the argument based on bias can be used in any engagement.
Both men (Rowe and Russell) were and are giants in philosophy. In contrast, I am merely
beginning. But the education and growth in apologetics and logical and critical thinking have
laid this tact on me for exploration. Additionally, and most importantly, this notion of engaging
bias is an idea born to me through the work of the Holy Spirit. It is not my own but God’s who
tasked me with the work. I intend to represent Him in this thesis, for the glory is His.
Statement of Position on the Problem
The intent has been uttered several times throughout thus far, to uncover the underlying
bias in an attempt to alleviate this bias so that rational understanding can be made, ushering in
belief. This does not follow without contention or issue, which will be addressed in the next
section, nor is this approach to correct previous resolutions. I believe that previous treatments of
the POE have been successful for the position of theism, specifically Christianity. Yet, the
arguments still flourish against the existence of God from evidential evil in the world. Looking at
the hearts and nature of humanity, it seems commonsense that what is divulged is an ill, faded
heart. Humanity is on a collision course to an evil end. The irrational, noncoherent view of the
world apart from what is real is a paradox. This paradox seems to be based on faulty assumptions
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that lead to ill-conceived paradigms forming faulty worldviews that question man’s place in the
creation. Presuppositional beliefs in physicalism/naturalism, humanism, evolution, Scientology
and other ontological worldviews seem to skirt away from the explanation of what coheres with
objective reality. It is here upheld that clearing the obstacles to view true reality is the research
emphasis of this thesis, a study of cognitive faculties which foster biases in forming worldviews.
Limitations/Delimitations
There is a multitude of limitations and delimitations in this project. To begin, the glaring
limitation is based on the cross-discipline study. My academic credentials are on the Christian
Apologetics side, even though there is a crossover with the philosophy of religion, specifically
epistemology, and the philosophy supporting CS and CSR. Nevertheless, research capabilities
allow for the increase of knowledge and discovery in the growing field of CS. Polling data from
psychological experimentation will not be undertaken.
The idea behind gathering fresh data or data through experimentation with focus groups
does not appeal in this research. Partly due to the youth of CS and CSR and the specialized field
of psychology and the study of the mind mechanism would not yield to a lesser trained
participant. Any needed data will be mined from existing studies and experimentation. Analyzing
this information and synthesizing the results will suffice if such is required. As far as analytical
presence goes, further treatment of Rowe’s evidential argument from evil will not be undertaken.
The main reason is that it has been critiqued with such enormity on the whole that additional
critique seems tautological. A further limitation, and probably the most difficult to synthesize, is
faith and reason. We cannot reason someone to faith as faith is a gift from God (Eph. 2:8). How
then does one correct a bias with the intent to bring someone to faith? The key here, I believe, is
that I am moving people in a direction to be able to receive the truth; it is up to them if they reach
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for it. Here, the conflagration seems to fester for those who do not believe. I believe in my heart
that God exists and believe in my mind the same. It seems apparent that unbelief lies somewhere
within this foot of physical space and immeasurable existential space, causing the conflict
between heart and mind. This conflict results in a faulty sense of reality and the individual’s
place within it. Removing the objective and abstract spaces noted is the key to the true, correct
belief and a limitation, the bias which is the focus is also present in me.
Lastly, it seems counterintuitive to attempt to treat bias in others and not recognize my
presuppositions. My biases forge my understanding of reality and how I fit into this realm. They
are theistic, specifically Christian, holding to God’s precepts and that there are aspects of God
that are difficult to explain. Even though difficult, these aspects still speak to reality and make
sense of all there is and humanity's place within it. The best way I know how to combat my bias
in this project is to look objectively at data and research with fairness and humility. To represent
those cited fairly and as they state their case. The questions I ask along the research trail should
equally be asked of my own beliefs, then wage the answers in a matrix that results in equal, fair
treatment. I cannot remove my bias but must recognize its presence in my position so that it can
be accounted for.
Method
Research Methods
The research method for this project is simple in that a search for available scholarly
treatment will be culled out and analyzed. The areas to be treated will relate to philosophy,
apologetics, psychology, aspects of sociology, and anthropology. In these areas, biases are
formed on the individual level, corporate (being community), and ethnically. Otherwise, a
literature review and synthesis should suffice. The literature survey will encompass bias and the
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cognitive mechanism that form basic assumptions guiding the thought and belief process. It has
been discovered thus far that a sizeable portion of research in this area focuses on the corporate
and business world as attempts to reduce bias are engaged to increase productivity and market
share as it pertains to employer/employee relations and consumers, which herald the various
products. This material will be evaluated for its contribution to the overall use in bias
development and synthesized into the finished product. The forming of biases may be so due to
varying circumstances, but the result is useful in this research. This is the same for scholarly
work in Christian apologetics and philosophy.
In like fashion, a detailed search of contemporary POE arguments and refutations will be
undertaken to surmise the current climate of the issue being treated here. The philosophies that
undergird the platforms of those submitting arguments will be compared to those existing in
history and how they have or have not progressed to the current position. This information will
then be synthesized into a composite frame to critique the POE's contemporary notion against
God's existence.
This appraisal of available data and research will be the project’s backbone, including
available studies conducted by psychologists, psychiatrists, philosophers, apologists, and others
in the relevant fields that have furthered the study of bias and formal argumentation.
Tests or Questionnaires
The intent here is not to engage in tests or questionnaires related to bias. As noted in the
Limitations section, the lack of formal training warrants not conducting surveys or
questionnaires about bias. I do not believe some parameters can be met from my position in a
non-clinical environment. Research yields a plethora of clinical results performed by qualified
professionals, which will be utilized to support findings and positions. This may prove to be a
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liability in that research thus far shows that bias forms from infancy. Therefore, the upbringing
of a given individual would have definitive causality on long-held presuppositions or
assumptions about aspects of reality. If the need arises, bibliographic data will be sought to
attempt to account for this needed information should it become so. Additionally, I cannot rule
out the potential need for such data collection; therefore, accommodations, if required, can be
evaluated for practicality.
Data Collection
Data collection is the heart of this project. The use of the Jerry Falwell Library at Liberty
University will be the primary source. Additionally, academic journals featured in philosophy
and religion, psychology, counseling, and anthropology, including archaeology, will form the
nexus of collection and review. From cross-discipline studies, various clinical and focus group
data will be leveraged for contribution to this project. This is and will be an ongoing endeavor to
update this project with emerging research for the entirety of this project.
Data Analysis
Analysis of the researched and collected material will yield insight into bias formation. It
will also prove valuable in determining which biases conform the mind to assumptions about
religious belief or disbelief. The field of CSR will be the focus and bulk of the material used to
formulate an apologetic, engaging the bias of unbelief. This aspect falls on the review and
analysis of contemporary POE arguments.
The Epicurean dilemma has served unbelievers for millennia and is present in modern
arguments from evil against the existence of God. A robust counterargument focused on the
conception of a bias requires a careful, diligent, and fair analysis of existing arguments and those
that wage them. Therefore, each argument in question must be treated respectfully and fairly as
13

Christians are mandated in Scripture (1 Pet. 3:15). A corollary effect, which is anticipated, is
strengthening the faith of existing believers. This assists the believer in why they believe rather
than simply stating blind faith. It will also serve the church well in discipleship programs
pertaining to evangelism.
Proposal for Chapter Division
The proposed division of material gives a progression for the thesis. The overview of the
POE including the essential elements of the problem, purpose, and goals, lays out the
groundwork that the reader can follow. Chapter one introduces the study of cognitive science and
the discovered truths about bias, including methodology and Christian apologetics. Chapter two
is a cursory look at previous arguments from the POE, isolating the bias to be evaluated. Chapter
three is a detailed critique of Russell’s 2018 essay and the work previously assembled and put
into action, engaging the bias at the formation level. This arrangement is believed to give the best
reading functionality and coherence.
Proposed Summary of Each Chapter
The proposal for the chapters is simple in philosophy and construct. Beginning with the
basic overview of the evolution of the POE, it begins broadly and gradually constricts to the
thesis statement. Once the thesis statement is introduced, the work of the thesis gets underway.
The introduction contains the necessary information for the reader to gather the project’s
intention. It is a guide to what will follow based on the problem and purpose and the expected
outcome, including the research methodology. It is, in essence, litmus to determine the structure
and goal so the reader can unite with the work. This unity will allow an amalgamation of the
material with the reader to foster an internalization of the POE and a potential solution. Once this
relational aspect is established, the journey begins with understanding CS.

14

Chapter One
Chapter One holds the necessary information regarding bias and its connection to this
thesis. The chapter unfolds a young field of study explaining the mechanisms of the mind and
how beliefs are formed, held, updated, and changed. As the purpose is to expose a specific bias
or biases, it is critical to understand the platform of bias. It is also essential to narrow down the
bias to a particular or small subset of biases that generally account for belief, specifically, a
priori belief and unbelief. Additionally, CS has branched out into a subset field of study known
as the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). This field is dedicated to those beliefs,
presuppositions, assumptions, and biases which regulate religious belief. This is the target area
and thus needs room for growth and understanding for the reader. The a priori belief is a crucial
component relating to metaphysics and language.
The latter portion of chapter one engages the metaphysics of belief and the use of
language. The metaphysics of belief and the practical understanding of language are espoused
through the writings of Wittgenstein, C. S. Lewis, and Francis Schaeffer. These philosophies will
be applied to bias and tested by a worldview evaluation system by Douglas Groothuis. This
pragmatic system is the foundation for identifying and isolating bias and will be directed at the
writings of Bruce Russell in chapter three.
Chapter Two
Chapter two is an overview of the EAE, focusing on Rowe’s arguments from evidential
evil and beginning broadly with the categories of evil (logical and evidential), narrowing to three
arguments posed by Rowe and select refutations which accompany them. It is important to note
that this section is not another critique of Rowe’s work. This has been done adequately. Instead,
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a closer look at the refutations against the argument will entail the root of what is refuted in bias,
epistemic flaws, and the use of language. Additionally, Rowe’s work acts as an anchor for the
contemporary models of the EAE. The work in the first two chapters culminates in chapter three,
where the understanding of CSR is put into action to treat the bias which fuels the worldview
engine.
Chapter Three
Chapter three is a critique of Bruce Russell’s offerings of the EAE and looks to
synthesize the information gained from CSR and the POE biases to form an apologetic.22 The
intent is to engage the bias at a level where it can be isolated then disentangled to be tested
against reality for coherence; this is on the level where bias forms. The bias will be engaged
through the philosophies of Wittgenstein, the apologetics of Lewis, and the coherence evaluation
model from Groothuis. This engagement will occupy the EAE in various forms to achieve a
successful result. The chapter section will evaluate the process and critique the performance and
yield.
Conclusion
The research aims to identify the specific bias of an author in a penetrating approach to
exposing the fallacy brought on by the bias, to go deeper than merely invalidating an argument. I
do not wish to leave the bias intact only to refute or engage in another similar argument. It would
be presumptuous and excessive hubris to suggest that the goal here would be the death knell of
the POE. That mindset, I believe, is absurd, but it is humbling to engage the bias to change the

22

Bruce Russell is a Professor of Philosophy at Wayne State University. He holds a PhD in Philosophy
earned at UC Davis. He is an accomplished author writing many journal articles dealing with the POE refuting the
existence of God.
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structure that formed the bias. Does disentangling a bias mean an unbeliever will believe? Is it
possible to change or alter a bias creating a mental reform? The research to this point suggests
that bias reformation does occur. Even if the bias is not changed, the ramification of what could
be a return to rational thought could open the field to less relativistic interaction between
Christians, non-Christians, and peoples of other belief systems. As a Christian, establishing
meaningful communication is a step forward in reaching people with the Gospel of Christ (Matt.
28:19-20).
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Chapter One - Cognition: A Psychological Endeavor
Introduction to Cognitive Science, Cognitive Science of Religious, and Language
Thinking and reasoning are living. It is a window into existence as Descartes understood,
cogito ergo sum, I think therefore I am.23 This Latin phrase involves epistemic certainty, but the
ability to think is the underlying rationality of existence. Above any other creature, this ability
sets humanity apart and allows questioning reality and humanity’s place within it. This cognition
is the focus of Cognitive Science (CS). This field of study endeavors to understand how humans
think, process, and store data. CS studies the mind and its function; how it thinks.24 Narrowing
this field to certain aspects or areas of thinking ushers in the Cognitive Science of Religion
(CSR). Here, specific elements of thought entail regarding belief, specifically religious belief.
The biases that form a secular worldview from a religious (biblical) worldview are the focus of
this field of study. It is here that CSR seeks to illuminate the cognitive mechanisms which
synthesize data of religious nature through the acceptance, transmittance, and importance of
belief.25 This chapter will give an understanding of CS in general, including a brief history and a
broad view of the field of study. The CS subfield, CSR, will be espoused as it is the foundation
for bias and the human perception of reality, forming secular and biblical worldviews.
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Cognitive Science
This chapter may seem dreary and even mundane, but necessary. In a way, it is a
dogmatic pedagogical method to introduce a field of study to those unfamiliar with the breadth
and depth of the field and even ignorant of the existence of the field of CS. Understanding CS
must be a foundational element to understanding the onus of this thesis. As the thrust of belief
comes from the cognitive process, understanding this process is paramount, more so the
mechanisms used in forming knowledge, tactile and theoretical. The field of CS is vast;
therefore, this introduction is merely an appetizer to lay the foundation of clarity for further
chapters. It is wise to break down various areas of CS and then reproduce them in a cohesive
approach to processing data. Cognition is generally defined as “thinking and conceptualization,
memory, representation and mental imagery, perception, attention, reasoning, and decisionmaking.”26 Cognition is making sense of what is observed in the world and how the individual is
affected by and contributes to this information. These various areas can be further parsed into
cognitive processes. These processes are reasoning, memory, language interpretation, and
perception, to name a few.27 There are other sciences that contribute to or work into CS. Such
disciplines are “psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, anthropology, philosophy, and
neuroscience.”28 It is paramount to note that CS is not the same as or equivalent to neuroscience.
A computer analogy makes better sense of this position. Neuroscience is more about the
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hardware (the central processor, hard drives, RAM, and the motherboard are akin to the physical
brain and pathways). CS is more akin to the software (the programming that runs by the
hardware work akin to the cognitive systems that allow for reaction and reason to percepts or
stimulus).29 This is an analogy rather than a physiological melding of mind and body. Before
exploring the breadth and depth of CS, a cursory look at the history of this science is needed.
History
There is a somewhat definitive starting point in time for CS. It is understood that the
origins of CS fall within the eras of the 50’s and 60’s on the heels of the computer revolution
from the decade after WW II.30 The mid-twentieth century was a time of philosophical newness
and technological advances, which undoubtedly contributed to the field of CS, bringing it to its
current form and function. From a cognitive aspect, it could be argued that CS, at least the
cognitive portion apart from science, has been studied since the creation of humanity. This can
be conceptualized in parents’ minds when ascertaining why their child committed a specific act
and what thought process was at work in deciding that this act was rational or excusable. From a
biblical perspective, one need only look at Eve’s consumption of the forbidden fruit to ask the
question of what she was thinking (Gen. 3:1-6). The intent here is not to exegete the passage but
to show that people, since creation, have done things that bring questions of why and what for.
Looking deeply at this event in history questions the cognition used in perception, reason, and
representation. Also, this passage plays heavily on language when the serpent questions the
words God said and plants a seed of deception in the crafty use of language. The dawn of Greek
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philosophy is a pointer to cognition. If the philosophical age is the dawn of humanity’s ability to
reason the world around them, this would also be a time of cognitive identification. Gardner
posits, although more for reflection then a certain CS beginning, that cognitive investigations are
observed in ancient Greek thinking as far as the extent of knowledge.31 Gardner continues
through time forward into the Middle Ages, where theologians postulated the origins of
knowledge, continuing into the age of enlightenment and the weight of human reason.32 It is not
to say that the intent of these ancient thinkers endeavored to engage in CS; instead, to
demonstrate that the quest to understand why has been a staple of thought since the beginning of
humanity. It was in the last half of the twentieth century to present that the field of CS was born.
Still, it is essential to understand the history that brought the current cognitive understanding into
observable processes. This brief existence is replete with literature and ranging disciplines from
the physical brain, philosophy, psychology, the social sciences, and computer science with
artificial intelligence (AI;) a fascinating area of study and application is computer/mind
computation and robotics.
General Application
The implied need to model thought processes of the mind in the neuro connections and
mapping of the brain places a heavy reliance of artificial intelligence on CS. With a beginning in
1956, at the outset of the computer revolution, a new language emerged, understood as the
computational hypothesis.33 Understanding how the brain and mind compute data, yielding
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knowledge is the focus of AI. The somewhat reverse engineering allows for more intelligent AI
and what may someday be autonomous AI. The same onus is in robotics.
The area of robotics is closely intertwined with CS in the same manner as computerbased technologies. But rather than a desktop computer, a whole AI body functional to perform
short-term and long-term tasks using tactile sensory input, memory, and positional knowledge of
the world is the intended symbiosis of the two fields of study.34 Here there is a seeming
detachment from a dualist system where the mind and body (brain) are not distinct but function
as one and one form, a cognitive architecture. This system incorporates “a set of representational
constructs, information processes, and control structures that implement the invariant structure of
the cognitive system” to construct a platform to combine intelligence structures and intelligent
behaviors.35 There is a paradox here in that intelligent design begets intelligent design. From
studying the neuropathways and cognitive systems, mimicking the human construction will
somehow ultimately relate to autonomous sentient beings. Looking at this platform, the
construction of a self-thinking robot is possible because it can conduct simple and, at times,
complex movements and actions. This is based on the complexities of memory and the cognitive
process which constitute or represent prior experiences.36 This is a marvel of science and
engineering, and the potential is astounding. It also raises philosophical questions such as free
will and choosing good or evil. It is one thing to pattern an action from previous experiences but
quite a different thing to choose to act or not. This is the juncture away from neuroscience and
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into the underlying presuppositions studied in CS. These presuppositions form the biases which
determine belief, unbelief, and knowledge.
Cognitive Bias
Bias lies in decision-making. Decisions are made continuously every day, all day long.
The most mundane rudimentary actions or inactions result from decision-making. These
decisions can be conscious or unconscious. Many decisions are made in a day, too many to
count; therefore, the brain makes shortcuts to simplify these decisions and to quicken the
response. This leads to speed but also errors in decisions which are defined as cognitive biases.37
As bias underlies decision-making, it is easy to see why so many corporate structures utilize bias
studies in marketing. The decision-making process is studied, and strategies are formulated to
take individual and group biases into account for advertising and merchandising. In this
economics is a large consumer and examiner of biases. To use individual bias to sell
merchandise based on the shortcuts relies on quick decisions by the consumer to increase sales.
This shortened pathway leads to cognitive bias or an error in decision-making. This error does
not mean failure, but the purchase of a candy bar is a likely outcome, given certain circumstances
rather than others, when another item would be a better choice. These shortcuts are present at
first thought or apprehension of information observed around us. In his Nobel Prize work
Thinking, Fast and Slow, Kahneman defined this action in terms of system one and system two.38
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As Kahneman deduced, system one is fast action or reaction, while system two requires
attention.39 It reduces to comfortable decisions with little effort or more robust computations
with directed attention to the data and outcome. System one carries no doubt and is pointed to
creating stories meeting the criteria for coherence.40 System two is somewhat opposite in that
doubt is possible, and the potential for conflicting data to be maintained can occur.41 Whereas
these systems are a focal point in Kahneman’s research, they are the brainchild of Keith
Stanovich and Richard West.42 Given these systems, the obvious question is which one is more
likely to yield errors or cognitive bias? The answer is both. The two systems, also understood as
intuitive and reasoning, utilize intuitive data to form reasoned explicit judgments.43 Here what is
initially perceived and intuitively understood is rationalized, reasoned, and stored in the memory
as a judgment. This is seemingly easy to do based on the accessibility. Accessibility is “the ease
(or effort) with which particular mental contents come to mind.”44 It is this ease of effort which
fosters cognitive bias, therefore, errors. Additionally, if there is an event in system one that is not
deemed inaccurate, it will proceed as if it were true.45
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The foundation of the errors is that it is easier to believe rather than compute the doubt.46
Although these errors can be reduced or eliminated by skill or practice, the average person is
subject to false judgments.47 As exciting as this field of study is, there is a belief that it has not
materialized as it was believed or hoped. This amalgamation of disciplines into one unified field
of study or program seems to have missed the mark.48 It is unclear why this is the case, but there
have been uses of CS in various other platforms, such as religion. This subfield of study is the
focus of and related to this thesis. This field is known as the Cognitive Science of Religion.
The Cognitive Science of Religion
Cognitive Science looks to answer questions such as what the mind is and how it
functions. The Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) is an emerging field of CS that looks to
answer questions regarding the “formation, acceptance, transmission, and prevalence of religious
beliefs based on the function of the mind and its cognitive mechanisms.”49 This section deals
with beliefs, reflective/non-reflective, and the biases that accompany them. These biases lie in
context and content, thus deposed first, and heuristics ultimately lead to confirmation bias. As it
pertains to argumentation from the Problem of Evil, it is taken here that a significant influence
on the atheistic position is that of confirmation bias.
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Context Bias
Context bias, as understood here, is the form or source of something or source of
information. This pertains to the reliability of the source of information.50 There has been
considerable work in this area substantiating reflective religious belief. A communal action or
transference of information via other people or a person is a significant factor in belief formation
and retention.51 This transference occurs in three areas of bias; conformity, prestige, and
similarity biases.
Conformity Bias
Conformity bias is a belief based on what others believe. A common renunciation of
Christianity is that you are a Christian because your parents are. Sadly, in many cases,
undiscipled Christians do not refute this as they are confronted with another conformity bias in
unbelief. Lacking in the knowledge of their Christian faith, doubt sets in, and the statements
refuting Christian faith as propagated generationally cause a conflict in information. A recent
study engaged the physical interdependency of two areas of the brain about conformity bias via
society and private interaction.52 This performed test yielded a connection between the striatum
and the dmPFC, where emphasis was found to be present in both exposures and shared between
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these two regions of the brain.53 This study goes beyond the lines of this thesis (neuroscience),
but it can be understood that conformity bias is prevalent and that good and bad information can
be shared and received. Of greater importance is the validating process to strengthen the shared
data and source. Another bias within the context arena is prestige bias.
Prestige Bias
Prestige bias is brought from the lack of consensus. This term, consensus, is becoming
more ubiquitous and will play a future role in this thesis by way of confirmation bias but for
now, it is important to understand that in the lack of consensus, prestige bias latches onto a
source, singular or group, who has prestige or power and authority.54 This is akin to center stage
with the use of celebrities to endorse a product or a sports figure to engage in a societal endeavor
to feed the homeless or take care of abandoned and mistreated animals. The caliber of the
individual or group is used to bias the hearer to engage in the proposed action. This same bias
has been observed in chimpanzees like human children. In either genus, the younger adapted or
learned from those with higher prestige in the group or society.55 Lastly, as is related to context
is similarity bias.
Similarity Bias
Similarity bias is, as it seems, the yearning to like someone or a group collectively incites
this bias. This can be understood in people who think alike or look alike. Here the bias lies in the
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likelihood of relevant information by way of likeness.56 Although this area of bias is extensive, a
glaring postulate is gender similarity. The phrase all men think alike is foundational to this area
of similarity. This statement may not be factual, but there are similarities in the way men think
about various subjects. This group of people is based on similar characteristics that share a
common ideology or action based on similarity. The biblical response to this grouping of bias
suggests that what is known and studied today was prevalent from antiquity and espoused in
Scripture. The previous, succinct listing belongs to a larger category of testimony57 and the
leverage placed on the trustworthiness of that which is given in religious parlance.
Scriptural Response in the Old Testament
The virtue of teaching or passing information, specifically religious ideology, to other
individuals, family, friends, or coworkers has a rich biblical history. The passing on of
knowledge, being the primary means of the testimony of biblical truth, is most magnanimously
observed with God’s special revelation of Himself to humanity. An example of God’s special
revelation is known as the Shema. Deuteronomy 6 begins with loving God with all your being
and progresses into teaching His precepts: “’ You shall teach them diligently to your sons and
shall talk of them when you sit in your house and when you walk by the way and when you lie
down and when you rise up. “You shall bind them as a sign on your hand and they shall be as
frontals on your forehead. “You shall write them on the doorposts of your house and on your
gates.’” This pericope broadens the scope of testimony to the verbal and written form of God’s
revelation to the nation of Israel. Here the emphasis is on personal testimony to smaller groups
such as families. The book of Proverbs probes the depths of wise counsel as well.
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The book of Proverbs is wisdom in written form. The book itself is a contrast or
comparison of right and wrong or good and bad information and actions.58 It is not a self-help
handbook but a truth in life that answers the tough questions.59 This Old Testament (OT) book of
wisdom is replete with instructions about life and reality. In the many areas of imparted wisdom,
a few verses in chapter four give credence to the acquisition of wisdom. In contrast to chapter
three, chapter four does not list the name of God, but parallels are drawn from the extensive
reference to God from chapter three in like manner.60 The first verse, “Hear, O sons, the
instruction of a father, and give attention that you may gain understanding (Prov. 4:1).” Here we
can see the prestige and similarity bias. Prestige in the information is coming from a father who
would naturally be a figure of significant influence in a child’s life. As for similarity, they are
family, but not in the sense of conformity bias. Doing something or thinking a certain way is
predisposed by familial relation but by kinship in blood and passing of wisdom. One additional
verse to explore is Proverbs 4:20, “My son, give attention to my words; Incline your ear to my
sayings (Prov. 4:20).” The call to attentiveness echoes a discernment as well. Here, the dissecting
of information to an attentive ear is akin to a medical inspection or a physical.61 It is a guarding
against sickness. Among others, this sickness is an intellectual sickness, one that comes from
within.62 The emphasis on context bias here is a good thing because discernment and attention
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are stressed. Forgoing an exegesis of all the prevalent passages in proverbs or other books in the
OT, a cursory look at context bias in the New Testament will conclude the biblical excursion.
Scriptural Response in the New Testament
Like the OT, the New Testament (NT) is replete with wisdom as it is passed down from
person to person or through generations in verbal and written form. Two passages that draw
attention are in Hebrews and Titus. Each speaks to a different platform of information sharing,
one being the church or corporate gathering, and the other generational instruction not
necessarily within a family setting. In first-order, Hebrews 10:22-25 instills in the believer the
need to meet as an assembly. This meeting engages the mass to learn how to espouse faith, hope,
and love.63 In effect, to learn those things that foster truth, solidarity, and life from each other.
Conversely, Titus 2:1-8 speaks to generational teaching. The older men are to teach the younger
men and likewise for the women of age and youth. Each generation is to be of sober mind and
doctrine. Verses 1-5 implore the older generations to be sensible to teach that which is of worth.
Verses 6-8 instantiate the same for the younger generation to be taught; they should be sensible
and upright. Here, the individual task of testimony is also met with examples to include what is
being taught, correct doctrine. This is a biblical example of the context biases combined with
content bias. This sampling is brief but gives insight into context bias. This also plays into
content bias in similar ways.
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Content Bias
As context speaks to the source of information, content is the information or data
specifically. The synthesis of this data is assimilated in various ways. Tactile engagement
through empirical perception is a prevalent mode in which cognition makes sense of what is
around us. As such, this is natural cognition and maturational.64 Memory has a key role in this
natural cognition and is finite in several ways. One is the amount of active memory, which is
engaged or involved, approximately seven chunks at a time, give or take.65 The other rests in the
sheer amount of knowledge or memory we all have. Much like a hard drive for a computer, there
is only so much space that can be filled with data. A specific influence on this storage issue is
intuitive knowledge.
At the risk of oversimplification, intuitive knowledge is tantamount to commonsense.
Procreation in living things brings this to mind: humans have human babies, primates have
primate babies, and chickens have chicks.66 It is counterintuitive for horses to have pig offspring.
This is intuitive knowledge formed in part from what is observed in the world. This creates a
shortcut in the memory process, allowing for space otherwise taken up with tacit facts to be
supplemented with intuitive cognition. Another way of seeing intuitive knowledge is instinctive.
Mental heuristics produce instinctive knowledge and is understood as ongoing interpretive
learning.67 Described as intuitive ontologies, these beliefs or understandings of life are “not the

64

Ibid., Barrett, Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology, 35.

65

Ibid., Barrett, 31.

66

Ibid., 33.

67

A. D. Banasiewicz, Evidence-Based Decision-Making: How to Leverage Available Data and Avoid
Cognitive Biases, 1st ed. (New York: Routledge, 2019), xii, accessed September 4, 2021, www.taylorfrancis.com.

31

product of deliberate reflection or scientific investigation.”68 It stands to reason that these
intuitions are present in infancy and are the mechanisms that situate an individual to the world
around them. As it is a progression of ongoing learning, what is understood forms a basis in
knowledge that is then compared to new data of the content, then compared to what is stored in
memory or prior experiences for relational equivalence. Content bias is dependent on coherence.
Internal and external coherence is the checks and balances system of content bias. What
is understood must be coherent with what is observed and real. This comparison yields credence
to what is being perceived or information being transmitted. The closer or matching quality of
the data increases the likelihood of acceptance. For internal coherence, a statement offered must
be constituent within itself, or the suggestion of falsity or lying is immediately suspected. An
example would be a human with proper cognitive function, stating they are a bird and flapping
their arms, saying they are flying. This statement lacks internal coherence as this person is not a
bird and their proper cognitive function suggests otherwise. This same statement lacks external
coherence. The statement recipients understand what a bird is and that this person’s statement
does not match external knowledge. Cruz rightly notes this as a conflict with beliefs already held
about a given topic or subject.69 The culmination of what has been discussed thus far lays the
foundation for beliefs, these being the elements for forming worldviews through reflective and
non-reflective beliefs.
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Reflective/Nonreflective Beliefs
The results of system one and system two form beliefs through intuitive reaction and
reasoned input stored as judgments becoming beliefs. In similar but different relations, reflective
beliefs are reasoned, and nonreflective are intuitive. This position is also referred to as a dual
process about religious belief.70 This approach is necessary as the initial data, spanning the early
decades of research regarding religious belief, believed that such belief was born from the
intuitive or non-reflective belief.71 This stance postulated a non-reasoned approach to religious
belief, contradicting more contemporary research and experiment. Reflective beliefs are
propositional relating to apparent descriptions of various objects or entities.72 An example would
be the car is red, or the jar is round. As Barret notes, these propositions do not necessarily need
to be true, false, or otherwise.73 In conjunction with reflective beliefs are non-reflective beliefs.
Nonreflective beliefs are intuitive. They are present without much effort, somewhat
commonsensical, and automatic in reaction. They are natural and often unknown, not requiring
intentional reflection for formation.74 A non-reflective belief would be that a frowny face would
be bad to an infant or that a smiling face is good. These examples show that intuitive knowledge
(belief) is understood without prior experience, even in infancy; it seems to be innate. Here lies
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the need for a dual system as it is observable that beliefs occur in the conscious and unconscious.
The interesting aspect of these belief systems is how they intertwine.
A symbiotic paradigm better understands the relation between reflective and nonreflective beliefs. In other words, one is the basis for the other. The non-reflective (intuitive)
beliefs form the basis of belief, which is confirmed through reason.75 Unless there is information
that negates the belief, it will stand. This relates to another bias and is critical to this thesis,
confirmation bias.
Confirmation Bias
Worldviews are comprised of information understood about the world and how a given
person fits within that paradigm. As attested here, the cognitive faculties that collect and analyze
this information are vast and somewhat complex, although it is understandable with a bit of
commonsense. This area draws the impetus of this thesis and how the position of confirmation
bias lends continued arguments against God’s existence from the problem of evil (POE).
Confirmation bias is defined as discounting information that conflicts with held beliefs.76
Confirmation bias is observable in the myriad arguments against God from the existence of evil
in the world. Not that evil exists, but that God does not is the fundamental belief of atheists, and
when confronted with information to the contrary fall into the confirmation bias. This bias is
exhibited in the writings of Rowe and Russell and will be engaged in chapters three and four.
The demonstrated confirmation bias is vexing in that when contrary evidence is posited for
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God’s existence; it is dismissed in a confirmatory notion of held beliefs.77 Confirmation bias is
further defined as “the tendency to search for, interpret, focus on, and remember information in a
way that confirms one’s preconceptions.”78 In a consumer setting and a simple basis of
understanding, confirmation bias yields purchasing the same food from the grocery or ordering
the same meal at a favorite restaurant. There is an unwillingness to deviate from held beliefs
even in the marketplace of eating. There is a tendency to evaluate information more stringently
when it is consistent with existing beliefs and, in contrast, disconfirms when this information is
contrary.79 This bias ranges in efficacy from everyday people to scientists and academicians.
Confirmation bias is not bound by vocation or education. It has been observed in
scientists and academicians, including theologians and philosophers.80 An example given by
Cruz is the Kalam Cosmological argument and natural theology.81 As posited in arguments that
span antiquity, what becomes must have a cause. Cruz uses the following syllogism: 1)
Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence; 2) The universe began to exist; 3)
Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.82 Cruz then exhorts the plausibility and
empirical support for premises one and two but insists that theologians and philosophers of
religion dissent on the conclusion (3).83 Nevertheless, it is also posited that acceptance of this
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argument is based on confirmation bias on a presupposition or prior religious beliefs.84 This is
contrary to what Barret rightly asserts about intuitive knowledge in youth from infancy to
preschool-age.
Barret, citing previous studies of intuitive knowledge in infants through preschool-age
children, shows the innate understanding that an object will not move unless force or another
source of motion causes the object to move: this understanding is understood as quickly as
merely a couple of months into life.85 Extending this proven information to cosmology would
suggest the same as extrapolating movement into existence or being. If something did not
previously exist or remained motionless, something occurred to bring this into existence or create
movement. This intuitive knowledge is not dependent on prior religious beliefs but rather innate
knowledge or understanding. The position of acceptance of a cosmological argument may yield
support from a prior religious belief but is not solely dependent. Here lies a dissent within
Christendom as to the involvement of evolution and Big Bang cosmology in the creation of the
cosmos instead of biblical creationism as espoused in the book of Genesis. It is a seemingly
abject disregard of data contrary to a held position. The confirmation bias is prevalent in
arguments where the present sense perception of the world, specifically the POE, is only as far as
can be pontificated internally or personally. This position cannot possibly account for the whole.
Language and Cognition
Language is the vessel of communication for the mental representation of our cognitive
understanding. As noted, representation and imagery are nodes of cognition. This locus is where
language instantiates cognition, forming knowledge into word and deed. A highly influential
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agent in this area is Ludwig Wittgenstein. His system of language in cognition sought to unify
“agreement,” this being the praxis of life.86 This philosophy of language would eventually give
way to a postmodern paradigm that touted subjectivism.
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein asserted that language was constrained within a metaphysical belief
boundary.87 This means what is pictured in the mind is the product of interpretation of the data
perceived through interaction and intuitive knowledge. In this, a proposition is a thought, which
is a metaphysical subject.88 This metaphysical subject is beyond justification as it is a limit of the
world (and cosmos) or that which can be thought. Here lies a distinction between proposition and
presupposition. Gilman masterfully juxtaposes Wittgenstein and Collingwood’s philosophies to
draw out implications in Wittgensteinian thought. This instantiates Wittgenstein’s notion of the
metaphysical subject as equating with what is a boundary or beyond the limits of language or
sense.89 An important distinction is needed in that the limitations of sense do not reduce to
nonsense; instead, it is the limits of language to convey the thought (metaphysical subject). This
specifically speaks to the phenomenology of spirituality. In comparison to Collingwood’s

86
Frank Scalambrino, Philosophical Principles of the History and Systems of Psychology: Essential
Distinctions, (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 197, accessed September 7, 2021, https://doi.org/
10.1007/978-3-319-74733-0.

James Gilman, “The Metaphysics of Belief: A Wittgenstein and Collingwood Convergence,” An
International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 53, no. 4 (Dec. 2017), 499, accessed September 16, 2021,
http://ezproxy.liberty.edu/login?qurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.proquest.com%2Fscholarlyjournals%2Fmetaphysics-belief-wittgenstein-collingwood%2Fdocview%2F1960508952%2Fse2%3Faccountid%3D12085.
87

88

Ibid., Gilman, “The Metaphysics of Belief,” 501.

89

Ibid., Gilman, 501.

37

absolute presuppositions, Wittgenstein’s metaphysical subject is the mystical or transcendental.90
As they are beyond the limits of the world (language of thought), they need no justification. This
is due to the metaphysical subject not being constitutive to the world.91 This leads to an
interesting position Wittgenstein endorses and one that Bertrand Russell notes in the introduction
of Tractatus. This position is the action between language (thought), speech, and demonstration.
In this, the caveat of action is the ideation of language. As Russell states “shown” about
the nature, lies in the language and the structure.92 Here is a delineation of two forms of show or
shown. One lies in the definition and the other in action. Both are essential to Wittgenstein’s
position of language and the metaphysical subject. As the definition goes, how do you define
appearance, such as beauty or ugliness? It is not necessarily definable other than to show what
beauty is or, in contrast, what is ugly. The use of language does little to define what is beautiful
outside of the boundaries of language. To speak the representation of a mental picture of beauty
needs a connotative example so that “shown” goes beyond the limits of language. In contrast,
action is also a means of description of definition. The “metaphysical beliefs are transcendental
and absolute, originating and regulating a way of thinking and living in the world, a way of
seeing and behaving.”93 This action, right living, is the onus of justification. It is argued that
many unbelievers live moral lives. Granted, this is so, but what is the onus of this lived life?
Does it lie in a social contract? Is the terminus based on an allowance from society or other
individuals? The intent here is not to wage a discussion of morality or ontic responsibility, but
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rather to show that from this right living is a metaphysical subject (belief) which is a terminus a
quo. This, where Wittgenstein rejects the precepts of justification, is where the action of “shown”
carries the weight of belief or a practical justification.94 This practical justification is in the form
of worldview and practice or praxis. As a worldview, or as stated by Gilman, a world vision,95
this entails a culmination of all there is in the field of view of an individual. If this worldview
does not need to be justified by the metaphysical subjects of which it is comprised, it surely must
be able to answer questions about life, reality, and right action (praxis). Before engaging this act
of worldview authenticity, a needed parallel between metaphysical subjects (beliefs) and
intuitive knowledge must be structured.
As argued, the metaphysical subject (belief) is not subject to justification. It is there but
transcendent of what can be formed linguistically. This primitive ontology is an action apart
from cognition; it is, at times, intuitive.96 This means there is an action within the individual that
initially acts apart from cognition but is not void of cognitive apprehension. Here lies the
foundational element of intuitive knowledge and where it is believed that the metaphysical
subject is the same as intuitive knowledge. As argued, this intuitive knowledge is a
commonsense understanding, an acquisition not from hypothesis or theory but intuition; it is just
there without explanation or justification. These intuitions work together to form the basis of a
worldview placing the individual in a working model of the world around them and how they
function and interact within the bounds of that environment. These fundamental intuitions,
according to Wittgenstein, are not subject to justification but can and should undergo
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authentication as it reflects reality. A cognitive representation of the world and worldview of the
individual should respond and interact with reality, coherence, and praxis. Herein lies the
hermeneutic espoused by Wittgenstein of the representation of the individual’s experiences or
mental pictures of knowledge. This signals the use of hermeneutics to explain the meaning,
actions, and life,97 also known as the “linguistic turn.”98 This turn would depart from rationality
and reality in the postmodern dialectic.
Postmodernism
As Wittgenstein fostered a hermeneutic (interpretation) of mental representation and
cognition and praxis, postmodern ideology focuses on the use and interpretation of this
hermeneutic by way of the objectivity and subjectivity of language.99 More so on the subjective
horn, and what is known is by way of culture. Here, knowledge is a social and linguistic system
reflected by society or organizationally rather than a representation of reality based on
cognition.100 An example is morality. Many opine that morality is a social construct, an
agreement via arbitration where parties, individual or societal, make assertions and concessions
to establish proper behavior. Aspects of this are actual, but conversely, where does the root of
what is right come from? It cannot be a construct of agreed behavior as there is a “Natural Law”
which every human has intuitive knowledge of.101 Concerning knowledge, intuitive knowledge,
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this intuition is the terminus a quo. Morality is not the focus but an insight into the basis of bias
in cognition. As it pertains to knowledge, true knowledge cannot be had because the holder of
said knowledge is biased as a participant or recipient of that knowledge; therefore, further
espousal of the origin is question-begging in one’s own favor.102 This is a smokescreen denying
objective reality. Moreland rightly notes that reality is merely an assertion grounded in
community linguistics and background theory.103 Moreland distinguishes epistemic and ontic
postmodernism, with the former indicated in conjunction with knowledge and the latter with
reality. In both categories, the cognitive function is reduced to a societal or communal system
and an assertion-based statement or belief outside present perception. Both distort the truth, if not
outright reject it. This is observable today as a societal push seeks to redefine or reject the
orthodox understanding of gender. While not the focus here, the rejection of male and female, or
the position of changing one’s gender to anything that can be thought of, is the essence of this
mindset. Not specifically married to gender concerns alone but the false reality that an individual
can be whatever they wish simply by saying so. In contrast and contrary to Wittgenstein,
language is an emotion-based representation of feeling and an imaginary projection of reality
rather than a means to communicate knowledge. The philosophy has changed from answering a
basic question such as “why is there something rather than nothing?,” to not just something but
whatever can be thought of is an individual’s reality. This is the epitome of confirmation bias. As
argued, the question’s origin is akin to and proportional to one’s ontological commitment.104
This commitment lies in academic, societal, organizational, and scientific or the science
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community. Here, the ontological commitment105 of belief presupposes answers to questions and
is supported by confirming the beliefs held in these genres of people groups. It is a reinforcement
of beliefs by others who have the same or similar beliefs, thus akin to question-begging and, at
minimum circular reasoning based on a group or consensus thought alone. This same statement
could be and is waged against theologians and Christian believers in the same manner. But the
difference lies in the presentation and evaluation of information that instantiates a specific belief.
If this data supports a belief, then instantiation follows. If the data does not support the belief,
then an examination of the belief for credence should follow. The postmodern connection lies in
language change rather than an objective data review. It is a repackaging of an idea instead of a
change in bias resulting from the presented evidence. It is this philosophy of psychology,
changing bias, which fueled the evangelistic efforts of Lewis, Schaefer, and Groothuis.
Contemporary Era: A Methodological Change
The intent of this thesis is more than pointing to a bias in an argument. It is isolating the
bias and attempting to change the bias. The goal is not to win but to seek an objective evaluation
when credible evidence is offered in support of a position opposing the repackaging of an old
argument with a new language. The basic argument is the same with the same faults under
revised language. It seems the arguments themselves are circular, falling back on the pre-existing
arguments against God’s existence. The onus then becomes a new argument that seeks to remove
the bias fueling a worldview and faulty stances based on language, not for victory but for clarity
in the face of what is real and true. Among the myriad of modern and contemporary Christian
philosophers, three men stand out as taking positions to engage their interlocutors in more
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meaningful ways going beyond negating an argument to identifying a bias and attempting to
initiate a change in a worldview engine. This section seeks to illuminate the efforts of C. S.
Lewis, Francis Schaeffer, and Douglas Groothuis, with each contributing a specific action of
engagement which, when fused, creates an apologetic for identifying, isolating, and changing the
bias terminus a quo of a worldview.
Clive Staples Lewis
C. S. Lewis (1898-1963) was an academician renowned for his allegorical writings
depicting the truth of Christianity.106 Lewis being highly philosophical, was not a philosopher;
instead, he engaged in literary criticism and interpretation.107 This academic calling, par
excellence, would be the foundation from where Lewis would reach untold numbers of
nonbelievers and demonstrate Christian truth through persuasive writing. In contemporary times,
Lewis may be known best in the mainstream through his writings of The Chronicles of Narnia,
His most persuasive writing for apologetic impact is Mere Christianity.108
Mere Christianity is arguably Lewis’ greatest apologetic work. A simple search places
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this book on the top ten lists of many polling organizations; most place it in the top five.109 The
clear communicated message in this book stems from commonsense and from an intuitive
knowledge that is understood without formal instruction. Lewis’ use of symbolic and
metaphorical imagery spawns a clarity imparting light on what is otherwise a dark or skewed
understanding of truth. In other words, a metaphor with the analogy is more than decoration;
metaphors are the bulwark of Lewis’ rhetorical approach.110 In this simplicity is an elegance that
plays on the sensical. This, otherwise believed to be intuition, is prevalent in the mind and in
understanding mental symbols, linguistics.111 As this is rooted more in subjectivism, specifically
the use of language, the parallel is the avoidance of cognitive honesty. An individual wants
something to be true and uses the mental pictures that communicate cognition to support the
initial want. This intellectual dishonesty begins in the self and is fostered through the
confirmation previously held philosophical commitments.
As this pertains to the POE, rather than concede that there are unknown things that are
beyond the capability of human thought and cognition, it is easier to say that something does not
exist. But, because there is no path of communication to describe the intuitive cognition of the
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Anselmian “being than which nothing greater can be conceived”112 does not mean this being
does not exist. In like manner, to suggest that God does not exist based on no known reason for
an evil act to exist is dishonest to the intuition that He does. Through this simplicity, Lewis
guides his reader to true reality. Humans being finite, have a limited lingual capacity, therefore
they are unable to fully communicate the intuition of the supernatural God of the Bible.113 This
inability does not instantiate that God does not exist, only that humans cannot explain His
existence in full detail. In juxtaposition to Wittgenstein’s metaphysical subject, the intuitive
knowledge does not need justification; it just is.114 It is this position that Lewis works to show
the rationality of true reality, also known as metaphysical reality.115
As posed by Lewis, the metaphysical reality lies in the daily reality we all face. The
opening of Book One in Mere Christianity begins with a scene where the reader is introduced to
the storyline through a quarrel, or better, the act of quarreling.116 This event is readily understood
and known to the reader as they have likely seen or been involved in such activity. This realism
of life is the venue Lewis used to convey truth coherent with reality. This truth gives essence to
the metaphysical reality akin to Plato’s forms.117 The metaphysical is existent rather than a
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product of the mind; they are separate.118 This is observable in Lewis’ writing and
communication about beliefs that correlate with reality rather than convey an opinion. The
metaphysical subject does not need justification; it just is, like the quarreling people understood
by the reader. This reality is the seat from which Lewis engages the unbeliever. First, by placing
the topic of discussion into a reality frame with which the reader is familiar. It is this familiarity
that breeds correct logic as it is in reality. Then, the espousal of a specific belief emerges, not in
an attempt to convert119 but to demonstrate rationality that matches reality. This sensical appeal
to logic through real life is the foundation of engagement of the POE, and common refutations of
God’s existence based on evil appeals to the realism of what could be known apart from what
can be known and is known. It is the latter that acts as a hanger for contemporary arguments
against the existence of God. This metaphorical accoutrement is supported by confirmation bias
and the warmth given in a group of like-minded people who seek to fully know something,
avoiding the reality that complete knowledge of something is not always attainable. Exposing
this bias as Lewis does through real events opposing what merely relates in the mind to reality
shares space with Francis Schaeffer in what Schaeffer defines as “taking the roof off.”
Francis Schaeffer
Francis Schaeffer (1912-1984) was an apologist and theologian. U.S. born and educated,
Schaeffer and his wife spent many years in Europe, ultimately founding L’Abri (the shelter) in
Switzerland.120 This was a place for pontification of beliefs, a quest for answers on matters of life
and faith. It was the home of Francis Schaeffer and his wife Edith, which they opened to
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travelers and seekers. The life story of Schaeffer is not the intent here; instead, the love
expressed for his fellow man is the root of Schaeffer’s apologetic appeal. It is in love that
Schaeffer operated in exposing individual bias, not to tear down but to build up in love towards
evangelism of the Gospel. Love in truth is a hallmark of Schaeffer’s work.121 In opposition to a
sterile emotionless engagement of fact presentation, love proceeds with truth: they must know
you care before they care about what you know. In this vein, Schaeffer operated in
communicating his beliefs through compassion.
There is a curious notion from Schaeffer as it pertains to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of
language; that is, communication. The Wittgensteinian position of language as the venue to
communicate mental pictures of knowledge is furthered by Schaeffer’s position of
communication being a conduit of ideas from one mind to another.122 In this arena, things turn in
a postmodern world where language is more subject to emotion and feeling than objective truth.
Additionally, change in language over time affects the delivery and reception of the idea
communicated. The Christian vernacular is understandable to those who believe but not
necessarily those who do not.123 A mechanical, sterilely perceived approach does little to bridge
a relationship with an unbeliever as the ability to communicate is hindered due to the inflexibility
of language. In essence, one must become all things to all people (1 Cor. 9:22). The starting
place for this, as Schaeffer argues, is love.124 This compassion for humanity was emphasized in
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Schaeffer’s methodology as a presuppositional evangelist.
This methodology must first be separated as Schaeffer envisioned himself as an
evangelical rather than an apologist.125 His approach was presuppositional but not necessarily in
the classic understanding of the word, but from an understanding that each individual has
presuppositions with which they perceive the world around them.126 This is in contrast to the
classical understanding of presuppositional apologetics; that is, the belief in the truthfulness of
the Bible is the starting point to engagements.127 This foundational diagnosis where Schaeffer’s
methodology blazes the trail of pre-evangelism. Rather than pose an argument for God’s
existence, probing the interlocutor's existing presuppositions reveals the part that needs to be
replaced. An example would be automotive repair. A fault in an automobile must first be
diagnosed before the repair can be made. Often this repair requires the removal and replacement
of the faulty part to resume normal operation. Exposing this fault leads to correct function. As it
is with cognition and bias, Schaeffer’s approach seeks to isolate the fault for repair so that the
truthfulness of the Bible can be evaluated. This approach is coined “taking the roof off.”
The simple fact is that everyone has a set of presuppositions, whether they acknowledge
them or not; this is where the chasm begins between what is true apart from presupposed
belief.128 The emphasis here is the continuation of logic to a conclusion based on one’s
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presuppositions, walking an idea or belief further down the road to see where it leads. Here exist
two planes, one of reality in the created world and the other is man’s self, as Schaeffer states, his
“mannishness.”129 One’s presuppositions provide the explanatory power behind this worldview
between the world and humanity. Schaeffer’s position is that Christianity coincides with the truth
of what is (reality), and non-Christian beliefs, when followed to a conclusion, do not provide
truth. Therefore, what is perceived as truth changes leaving the root presuppositions unchanged.
There is no consistency between truth and non-Christian presuppositions versus what God
created; here lies the tension.130 The stress of the tension is magnified when presuppositions
(bias) are not corrected based on a faulty conclusion, which results in the holder living in
falsehood, changing the language, or denying the truth. This is the creation of a shell or structure
with a roof to shield the individual from reality. This is a particular example but can be
extrapolated to a larger group. In the case of the argument here, the roof is constructed through
confirmation bias within a group or individual to shield what is reality from a faulty
presupposition.
The roof is a shield from the point of tension.131 The roof shields ideals of the world as
well as those about humanity. An example is being whatever you want to be, or that at the core,
humanity is good. The Christian response is that the world has limits and that each person is
given gifts to work with (Rom. 12:6-8). Additionally, the root of humanity is not good; the heart
is deceitful and wicked by nature (Jer. 17:9). Calvin espoused that the heart is an idol-making
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factory: “a perpetual forge of idols.”132 The non-Christian worldview sees the possibility of
anything limited only to the individual's creativity and that people are good at heart. The reality
is that no matter how much someone wants to fly to the moon, without some technological
support, this is not possible. Likewise, given certain situations, the first response to pain, hurt, or
attack is a wicked one, not one from goodness. The roof shields the individual from these truths.
Schaeffer then explains, “The truth that we let in first is not a dogmatic statement of the truth of
the Scriptures, but the truth of the external world and the truth of what man himself is.”133 This
pre-evangelism is an engagement with the individual’s presuppositions from their secular or nonChristian worldview. The confirmation bias negates any information contrary to the
presupposition as a shield from reality. Only when this shield, “roof,” is dismantled can truth be
spoken. Then biblical truth demonstrates humanity’s need for saving, and this salvation in Christ
alone (John 3:36; 1 Cor. 15:22). Schaeffer’s method stresses the psychology of bias,
presupposition, and the metaphysical subject, not just as justification but in truthfulness. The
fault is exposed by taking the presupposition to a conclusion, leading to objective truth. There is
a clever way to expand this methodology through a litmus test of sorts devised by Douglas
Groothuis, which can establish beliefs against what is reality.
Douglas Groothuis
Thus far, several methods of engaging bias, confirmation bias, have been explored, which
engage on a psychological level at the origin of belief. The picture of engagement is becoming
more apparent, but the question remains as to how to change a bias? One additional method will
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hopefully shed light on this question, paving a path of pre-evangelism through the continuation
of a belief to a conclusion. The mechanics of this endeavor lies in what Douglas Groothuis terms
a “worldview hypotheses evaluation.”134 This method engages the worldview and, most
importantly, pierces the nucleus of the matter, the human heart.135 In the interest of fairness and
avoiding special pleading, the same questions must be asked of Christianity to determine the
foundational truth which the Bible espouses.136 The evaluation engages worldviews and the bias,
terminus a quo, which people hold to in the face of contrary information. The resulting test is
eight pronged.
As it is adduced as a worldview evaluation, it covers eight aspects or questions for a
given worldview levied against that belief structure.137 The questions cover basic sustainability
loci for the worldview. Without these, the worldview would not meet coherence with reality. The
questions are explanatory power, internal logical consistency, coherence regarding beliefs within
the worldview, factual adequacy, existential viability, intellectual and cultural fecundity, radical
ad hoc readjustment, and lastly, simple rather than complex explanations.138 As this
authentication process is intended for use in the whole of an ideology, it seems very prudent to
utilize this schema with a singular idea or smaller grouping of beliefs within the bigger whole.
Various biases can be identified, which could relate to a failure in one or more authenticating
questions. Failure in an area does not necessitate a total failure in the worldview but should
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induce weariness of the total coherence within the belief system or the individual belief. This
section is not intended to be a complete excurses of this authenticating system. A more in-depth
look and application will wait for a further chapter. Nevertheless, what is noted here is of value
to the whole as a strategy for uncovering faults in a worldview. It is a basis for the Christian
response, apologetically engaging bias and unbelief philosophically and psychologically.
Conclusion
This chapter has been challenging to compose, not merely in terms of the content of CS
or CSR but the vastness of each. In the vastness, the attempt was made to simplify the topic
without oversimplification or a reduction that removes the onus of the science of cognition. Life
is diverse and yet divergent in cognition. This divergence sets humanity apart from any other
creature. The study of cognition is a young science and yet, has not penetrated the mysteries of
what is intuitive apart from acquired knowledge. The working of the mind and that of the
material brain yields challenges as to how these entities relate to each other in a dualist
perspective. Neuroscience is making fascinating gains in this field, and still, there is a mystery of
causation. The field of CSR looks to understand religious belief and its understanding and
assimilation into the culture. The biases exposed through CSR are not exclusive to this field but
are prevalent in all areas of cognition. This chapter concluded with confirmation bias,
specifically how it pertains to evaluating evidence contrary to existing beliefs and the onus to
continued argumentation of the POE. This statement has an air of hubris to suggest that every
argument against God’s existence could or would be extinguished by abolishing confirmation
bias. This is not the case. It is the position that isolating this bias to evaluate contrary evidence
objectively answers philosophical questions which cannot be answered otherwise. The next
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chapter will seek to understand this position and the mystery of intuitive knowledge, and the
philosophical architecture of cognition, specifically that of religious belief.
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Chapter Two: The Problem of Evil (POE)
Introduction
Evil is present in the world; to say otherwise is an avoidance of reality. The myriad
essays and papers, thesis, and dissertations depict the solid presence of evil in the world and
humanity. These submissions detail the quest to disprove and prove the existence of the God of
the Bible. This, in the simplest form, is the war over the existence of YAHWEH, and each
written document is a battlefield. They are battles fought through words, ideas, emotion, and
experience. Philosophy and logic govern the parameters or the limits of the field where theology
and science engage dialectically, establishing each position for or against the existence of God.
Each side's strategy examines the same information and has access to the same scientific findings
but comes to vastly different conclusions. Here lies the exchange of rhetorical blows showing
fallacies that negate the other’s argument.
The imagery of war and battle espoused does not preclude that victory is the intent; it is
not and should never be. Instead, correcting a misunderstanding or faulty logic is the basis for
orthodox thought in objectively evaluating information. Showing truth coherent with reality is
the goal in any refutation of an argument, most notably by compassion, dignity, and respect for
those involved in the engagement with love (1 Pet. 3:15). The following pages will define the
Problem of Evil in its major categories (logical and evidential) and evaluate papers submitted by
William Rowe.139 The evaluation of Rowe will be cursory and targeted at the specific refutations
made by other philosophers and Christian apologists in epistemology, language, and bias. The
intent is to determine the cognitive basis from which the fault emerges, the bias which refutes
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God’s existence. It is to be noted that a second philosopher, Bruce Russell, has also produced
significant work in this area. Rather than devote space in this chapter, a detailed treatment will
ensue of his work in chapter three.
Issues with Evil
The problem of evil caries many varieties. As related here, the two main categories,
logical and evidential, will be the focus. Affirming the presumption that the reader is familiar
with the POE, a brief review will aid in establishing the venue for this chapter. The logical
position will first entail the refutations that have effectively dealt with this criticism. Then, the
cause of evidential evil will be examined, with emphasis placed on the arguments presented by
Rowe.
Logical Evil
Evil is a difficult conundrum for theologians and Christian philosophers as problems go.
In fact, for everyday Christians who share their faith, the dreaded questions of evil in the world
are a formidable obstacle. Additionally, evils endured by faithful Christians (death of loved ones,
divorce, victims of crime, etc.) place a strain on their devotion to God, causing a “religious
crisis.”140 This Evil is “the most influential consideration against the existence of God.”141 The
“most influential” thrust lies in humanity’s exposure to evil. One does not need to be directly
affected by evil to understand the impact on life and the world. The despair of war, crime, death,
natural disasters, and self-inflicted agony are visible. In this vein flows the full force of
arguments from evil, logical and evidential. In this section, logical evil will present a scant
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remedial discourse. A look at the basic argument gives understanding to the position of those
who refute God’s existence in the face of evil.
The Basic Logical Argument
No matter where the dialog begins on the timeline of human existence, the logical
argument from evil entails three premises: 1) God is omnipotent, 2) God is “wholly” good, 3)
and yet evil exists.142 The basic argument is the locus of all logical evil arguments. Mackie
insisted that a defender of theism would have to concede one of the three points to resolve this
issue.143 This would mean giving up that God is all-good, all-powerful, or evil exists. Neither of
these options is acceptable, as it is plain to see that to negate the affirmative form of any of the
premises would be creating a fallacy of the truth of each. Mackie states the theologian holds to
inconsistent doctrine, making the theological position irrational.144 The inconsistency lies in the
characteristics of God as posed in the basic argument; He is all-powerful, He is all good. These
are inconsistent with evil’s existence, a presupposition based on Mackie’s belief that God does
not exist. The argument is then structured and supported by a bias of unbelief that propagates
information and argumentation that flows from a confirmation bias. Confirmation bias is visible
in the arguments and solutions given by Mackie by way of what he believes is the case with
human epistemological finitude. He examines the free will aspect and surmises a paradox of
omnipotence; God is all-powerful but created something He could not control.145 This form of
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the argument has been maintained through time and has been squarely placed on God for cause
and effect. The free will aspect is offered, but a foundational element not probed is the will of
God to His end of what has been created, and those things, evil, which act against the will of God
and is pervasive in that which exists. A full examination of Mackie’s argument is not necessary
here, merely a rough overview of the logical horn of the dilemma of evil. In this regard, the
argument has effectively refuted the logical problem of evil, although this atheistic argument
seems to be gleaning support in recent times. Therefore, new perspectives of this horn of evil
argumentation promulgate fresh written discourse.
One recent argument offered by Kenneth Pearce delves into the natural
functional/teleological theory of the mind in support of the God of the Bible or, more so, the
logical consistency of God and evil. This topic denotes an expansion of mind study and venue
use in computer science areas; hence, as Pearce frames it, cognition is “intentionality.”146 This
piece has a connection with CS, so a more detailed treatment will be given later in this section.
For now, its presence is for contemporary enlightenment to demonstrate what was once
considered a settled topic, logical evil, was not settled after all.147 Pearce views the foundation of
his argument in the thrust of Plantinga’s free will defense.
In what may be an oversimplification of the basic understanding of his argument, Alvin
Plantinga states that God is not responsible for evil. This rests on the choices of humans based on
their free will. As noted previously, God and evil are not incoherent or incompatible, as Mackie
insists. The Plantinga defense is labeled the “Free Will Defense.” He posits that humanity has
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free will, meaning to choose to do a thing or to choose not to do that thing.148 This is a free
choice by a free person, which yields an action in the positive or the negative. This is an aspect
of being created in God’s image (Gen. 1:26). Aside from the literal physical appearance position
of “image,” the intent here is to demonstrate freedom or free will as part of this image. As
“image” is understood, one facet entails being able to choose our actions about causal reaction
and intentional action based on our ability to reason and cognition of the world which produces
emotion fueling want or action. Causal in reaction does not mean determined or antecedent
conditions which place the action or inaction contingent on causal laws.149 This is an area of selfawareness and reflection embedded in the image of God bestowed on people.150 This premise
shifts responsibility from God to people. A cursory examination of the defense reveals the basic
methodology.
There are two significant planes of this argument, free will, and possible worlds. It is not
the intent here to delve into the full breadth of all that pertains to each of these planes; rather, a
cursory examination is applicable here. Plantinga solidifies terms, specifically free will (as
defined above) and significantly free. The distinction between free will and significantly free lies
in moral action versus nonmoral choice. This translates to stealing or having dinner for breakfast.
The latter does not carry a moral tone. It is merely a choice to have a pot roast in the morning
rather than in the evening. Stealing is an amoral act, not only from secular law but also from
intuitive law, which implies that taking something that belongs to another is wrong. Another
example is breaking a promise. When you say you will do something by action or with someone

148

Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 165-166, accessed
October 29, 2021, www.oxforduniversitypressscholarship.com.
149
Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Cambridge U.K.: Eerdmans Publishing, 1977),
29, accessed November 4, 2021, Logos.
150

Ibid., Davis, Paradise to Prison, 80-81.

58

else and do not execute this intention, the other involved party receives this as a violation of a
“natural law.”151 Here, the onus is on the “significance” of the individual’s free will. Even if she
chooses wrong, the ability to choose either way is more significant than not having a choice at
all.152 The next course is “possible worlds.”
Plantinga poses that “possible worlds” lie in counterfactuals, what could have been given
certain states of affairs juxtaposed to what is the actual world. This “state of affairs” lies in the
complexity or fullness of such states.153 It is not merely from point A to point C or even a chain
of events that encompasses every alphabet letter. It is much larger than that. Plantinga notes it is
“so large as to be complete or maximal.”154 Another perspective to demonstrate the enormity is
to consider that this “state of affairs” goes beyond a single individual or event but is about all
events in the whole of “states of affairs.” This leads to the position of “possible worlds.” A
“possible world” is all “states of affairs” which could occur if the given circumstances are such
that a subject can choose A or not choose A. God, being omniscient, knows what will happen in
that situation (arguably also what will happen in every other state of affairs in that possible
world), all with the condition of free will: a given individual is free to choose a given action. In
this understanding, the actual world, this one, is such that in God’s omniscience and
omnibenevolence, what has been actualized was good with humanity’s free will, which brought
evil. In this, the premises 1) God is all-powerful, 2) God is all-good, 3) and evil exists does not
obtain an inconsistency or contradiction. The “Free Will Defense” was effective against the
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logical argument from evil. It is credited as being a philosophically adequate response to this
issue by some.155 The adequacy does not entail a lack of difficulty. This difficulty is the
springboard from which Kenneth Pearce launches a new argument aimed at the logical problem
demonstrating the consistency of God and evil existing through the creation of intentionality of
the mind.
Kenneth Pearce has developed an argument moored in philosophy, cognitive science, and
theistic belief, which goes beyond supplementation to existing arguments (namely Plantinga’s
free will defense) but offers another path to disprove the logical problem of evil. The essence of
the argument rests in the intentionality of the creaturely mind and that this intentionality exists
due to, at least, some evil in the world. In other words, without some evil, there would be no
creaturely intentionality of the mind. The notion behind the defense is the naturalistic
functional/teleological theory of mind he terms NFT (for the purpose here, this acronym will be
maintained).156 A more in-depth study of this rationale is beyond the scope here; thus, a brief
exposition of Pearce’s position will suffice. The proposition which exemplifies the argument is
as follows.
(M) God decided to create minds although it is impossible that created
minds exist in the absence of evil.157
The premise gives a footing for the bulk of the argument, which implies that God and evil are
consistent. As is explained, this theory maintains, “a state of an organism has representational
content if and only if that state has the function or purpose of indicating a certain state of the
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world to the organism, and it aims to give a fully naturalistic account of the ‘function’ or
‘purpose’ involved.”158 Hinging on the original intentionality of human thought, the mental
acuity of being in a state of affairs gives meaning.159 How does this apply or explain God and
evil? This lies in the meaningfulness of the system in which the mind interacts with what is
perceived and understood.
For the sake of space, a brief examination of the argument will ensue. Part of the
requirement of NFT is that it is a progression of sorts through various states only so with a
causal-historical explanation in processes of selection or adaptation (natural selection, evolution,
learned knowledge), such as a beaver giving an alarm of the presence of a predator.160 The
animal’s survival is predicated on the ability to sense danger (a state of affairs) and react to it.
The intent is not to demonstrate natural selection through survival but to surmise the threat which
caused the reaction, this danger being an evil of sorts. The intentional mind functioned based on
the representation of the evil (predator) and the ensuing good of safety. It took the evil to bring
about the preferable state of affairs. Pearce also notes that this intentionality also perpetuates
misrepresentations of states of affairs (also evils).161 This provides a historical setting as is
required by NFT, which instantiates the good as a progression, or learning tool, from an evil
(fear of the predator or the resultant death of the beaver from the predator). What is tangibly
observed is that a desired state of affairs (a good) is obtainable through some amount of evil or a
state of affairs less desirable than that which is to obtain. As Plantinga used the free will defense
to show God and evil are not in contradiction, Pearce uses cognitive science and the
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intentionality of the mind to demonstrate the truth that God and evil are consistent. This impacts
this thesis through belief and the mechanisms which produce it. This pertains to the logical
argument from evil in that an intentional mind grows or matures through some bit of evil and the
genuine mind produces belief which seeks what is true and avoid what is not.162
Belief would also coincide with intentionality, as it is required by NFT to show the
practice as selective through means of evolution, natural selection, or learning.163 For humans,
what has been shown to develop early in infancy of what is real and true versus what is false is a
complex culmination of cognitive function. The process incorporates evils for discernment of
what is good. This is a micro picture of a macro problem dealing with evil in all its forms but
shows the underlying problem of bias stemming from misrepresentation, which according to
Pearce, is an evil.164 With new treatments of the logical problem of evil, the onus and more
robust arguments retain a position on the evidential horn.
Evidential Evil
The work applied to the logical issues with God and evil has given way to the evidential
evil arena.165 More so with the gratuitous impact and the enormity or volume of evil present in
the world. Evidential evil is that which can be seen or felt, death, physical injury, amoral acts
against people, suffering, and anything opposite of good. It is unnecessary to define the terms
good and evil other than to say an individual in her correct faculties would understand the

162

Ibid., Pearce, “Intentionality,” 430.

163

Ibid., Pearce, 430.

Ibid., Pearce, 430. It is encouraged for the reader to examine Pearce’s article to understand the full scope
of what it entails as what is offered here merely scratches the surface of cognition, belief, and the consistency of
God and evil.
164

165

Benjamin K. Forrest, Joshua D. Chatraw, and Alister E. McGrath, eds., The History of Apologetics
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Academic, 2020), 704, accessed November 4, 2021, Logos.

62

difference. In this, to discuss the broadness of evidential evil would undergo an exposition not
suited to this thesis. Thus, the suffering endured by humanity will be the focus in evaluating the
basic evidential argument.
The basic argument from evidential evil follows what can be observed in the world as
pointless, excessive evil, and the inability to know or an absence of a good reason to allow such
evil to exist. This is a thorny issue with a force based on the reality that there is evil in the world
and a large amount of it. This issue is compounding over time into the contemporary setting with
arguments from atheists tilling the ground with assaults on theism from the evidential problem
from evil: it is more pervasive than ever. This does pose a serious concern for theism,
specifically Christianity. As the world is perceived with an abundance of evil, the question
stands, is this the best possible world? Leibniz believed it was,166 and others believe it is not.167
The locus of this question lies in the notion of “best.” This word seemingly has no other
connotation than subjective as who or what determines “best?” The “best” to one could be the
worst to another. In this context, what is “best” as God observed all possibilities and actualized
the one present. One can pontificate and hypothesize on what could be removed so that the
present world would be better, but there is no way to know for sure what degree and amounts of
something (evil) need to go.168 Tooley posits this notion when considering arguments from the
POE. His position is that removing evils from the world falls on ontic responsibility; God has an
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obligation to remove the evils He can, rather than axiological or by value.169 The ensuing state of
affairs which would follow if the evil requested were to be removed must be considered.
Schlesinger offered that a world without choice or diversity in “states of affairs” is unjust. It is a
degree of desirability in contrast to justice or injustice; the denial of access to the fullness of life
is an injustice.170 This is a proportional proposition akin to Leibniz’s position that the present is
the best possible world. Aside from agreement or not with this position, it stands that what is, is
seemingly proportional when surveying the good in the world. As this is, specific areas of evil
are propagated in the more infamous evidential arguments against God’s existence.
The Evidential Problem of Evil: Three Arguments against God’s Existence
It is challenging to isolate specific arguments against God from evidential evil, not due to
the lack of written or oratory discourse but rather the impact of such arguments on the mind and
faith. In this, two esteemed philosophers have had such impetus in this rhetorical exchange that
their contributions have fueled exchanges that have lasted for decades and whose work will
continue to support future engagements. These men are William Rowe and Bruce Russell.
Rowe’s arguments have garnered much attention and fostered a thought incursion deep into what
can be understood in the finite mind. Therefore, his offering to the discussion will be evaluated,
rather than critiqued, for his contribution to more contemporary positions. Russell’s offering will
be the focus of the critique, to include parallels to Rowe through language, and tone, focusing on
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the detected bias and the form the bias takes in relation to presuppositional positions against the
existence of God.
William Rowe: “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism”
Settling, or at least solidly answering the logical problem of evil, led to propagating the
evidential argument from evil. These arguments’ pervasive nature is akin to the volume of evil in
the world. The twentieth century yielded an onslaught of evidential arguments which continues
to gain momentum. Of particular interest here is the work of William Rowe. Rowe’s efforts laid
the foundation for many contemporary arguments and refutations, which fostered a deeper
analysis of Christian faith, the mind, and knowledge of what is and could be. It is a rampart of
today’s evidential arguments from evil. The basic premises of Rowe’s initial work is as follows.
P1: There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being
could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil
equally bad or worse.
P2: An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense
suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or
permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
P3: There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.171
Rowe metaphorically supports these premises with a story of the gratuitous suffering of a fawn
in the woods, trapped by a burning tree that fell onto the fawn, who succumbs to the grievous
injuries days later.172 There are two points Rowe insists on in this story. One is the unabated
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pointless (gratuitous) suffering and the shortened duration of said suffering or a quicker death
bringing an end to the suffering.173 It is here that Rowe places a stipulation that if God existed,
He would end the suffering in one of the two ways suggested. But, as this suffering went
unimpeded, P3 (God does not exist) follows. The force of Rowe’s argument is an inference from
P1 to P2 and the lack of appearance that there is a greater good which can be obtained as a result
of the fawn’s suffering. Rowe himself appeals that this alone cannot prove the truth of this
inference.174 He induces a rationality of belief based on what he perceives as a reasonable
position. This may be true in many instances, but it cannot be true in all instances. Here is a
quantity of occurrences. Rowe’s example of presidential candidates cites two people that will not
likely be elected president, and this is true. Still, the example is exceedingly narrow compared to
the fawn in the woods. The narrowness compounded with the scope of knowledge of Goldwater
and McGovern and the broad absence of knowledge of the fawn, the wood, and the weather (that
specific ecosystem) is incomparable based on what is not known about the fawn scenario. The
underlying bias of the inexistence of God rings through the argument.
Section II of Rowe’s argument looks at the potential theistic refutations. One specific
refutation is to negate P1 through insufficient reason, or other reasons conjoined, lack
justification to accept P1.175 This would be the “direct attack,” which would, of course, fail for
two reasons: 1) the theist cannot know the goods and evils which would obtain, and 2) theistic
tradition holds that we, humanity, cannot know all the reasons God allows certain actions such as
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suffering.176 Here the bias is observed, especially with a statement at the end of section one
where Rowe uses the term all to illustrate the evil in the world.177 It is a paradox how Rowe can
claim all but disallow the theist the same epistemic function. Rowe is claiming a broader playing
field for his argument and restricting the field for theists. This does not elicit a stalemate but
instead demonstrates Rowe’s conformation bias in the face of counter-information (or
acquisition of information) to his position. The converse of this argument from evil would be to
establish the same premises with the use of good, a move not allowed by Rowe or others. Not so
evil does not exist or that there are no known reasons for allowance, but good exists in volume.
The difficulty in this position would be the connection of said goods to the continuation of evils.
This hinges on the same epistemic issues of Rowe’s argument from the narrow scope of known
reasons or the lack of appearance of a reason to allow certain circumstances. This demonstrates
evil as a privatio boni (a privation of the good).178 It makes sense that what is good should come
first to determine the bad. This is a reverse of Rowe’s position. It does not infer that Rowe does
not see the good in the world, which would be absurd. But it does point out a lack of good in his
arguments or allowing this position in the theist’s refutations along the same boundaries as Rowe
instantiates his position against God. Confirmation bias is the adhesive that binds Rowe’s
argument and fuels his worldview of existence without God. This similar cement is observable in
Rowe’s subsequent POE offerings.
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William Rowe: “Evil and Theodicy”
Over four decades, Rowe engaged the POE arena with numerous offerings.179 As space
does not permit a review of each instance, his initial position (above) will be augmented with his
introduction and development of human suffering or agent action in his 1988 paper “Evil and
Theodicy.” Here Rowe adds human suffering, as was endured by a young girl dubbed “Sue,”
which is a true account of an incident in Flint, MI., in 1986. This incident was the sexual abuse
and murder at the hands of the girl’s mother’s boyfriend. Without going into the details of the
case, the thrust is that this is an extreme agent-caused action where “no good state of affairs we
know of” necessitates the allowance of this heinous act.180 There is a difference between the
1979 and 1988 versions as far as the addition of human suffering and language denoting what
can be surmised by Rowe regarding allowances for this evil. The language change is from the
“appearance” of a justifiable reason to “no known reason” for the justification of this evil. The
wording is different, but the onus of epistemological capability is the same.
It is a claim to knowledge that cannot be justified and one that Rowe concedes to but with
no change in the claim. He outlines his counterarguments, or responses, regarding “known
reasons” in three parts, each dealing with an aspect of knowledge acquisition.181 Particularly the
response C, which speaks to no known reason in respect to Q (no good reason for O [God] to
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allow the fawn suffering E1 or the girl E2) that these reasons would be ones not known.182
Surprisingly this is the counterpoint indeed. It is understood that affirmation of what is known or
believed to be known is a starting point. Still, it does not eliminate the possibility of an unknown
reason which, if known, would cause belief in a justifying reason for O to allow E1 or E2 instead
of a greater good or the prevention of a further or greater evil. Therefore, the absence of a known
reason does not negate the existence of a reason outright. It is simply unknown but must be
considered in the epistemic spectrum. This is the point of contention of this thesis, Rowe’s
refusal to accept the potential of a reason not known but still possible. This position is referred to
as Skeptical Theism, a point which will come to bear later in this chapter. For introduction
purposes, skeptical theism is a defensive position against evidential arguments from evil. Due to
cognitive incapability, we cannot know whether there are genuinely unknown reasons for the
allowance of evil.183 Another noteworthy expose of Rowe’s is his essay involving the use of
probabilities.
William Rowe: “The Evidential Problem of Evil: A Second Look”
This essay employs Bayes Theorem to show the improbability of theism. The premise is
based on a “level playing field” from which Rowe initiates his argument showing that the
probability of God’s existence is low, therefore not God.184 The onus of this essay is the
Bayesian calculus derived to determine the values for the premises. This also is a point of
refutation from theistic scholars. The argument is more simplistic as there are less premises, but
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the simplicity is obscured in the complexity of probability calculus. The argument by Rowe’s
account is a combination of inductive to deductive based on conjunctive goods and shared
agreement in some instances between the theist and atheist. The formulation of the argument is
as follows:
P: No good we know of justifies an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being
in permitting El and E2; therefore,
Q: no good at all justifies an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being in
permitting El and E2; therefore,
not-G: there is no omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being.185
The inductive move comes from P to Q and deductive from Q to not G (~G).186 Here is the first
of what would be a torrent of dissent. Rowe’s inductive move is based on a generalization from
no known good to a deduction of this generalization to no good. It is here that this method does
not work well as the first premise; being inductive to the second can yield falsity. This means
that the premise does not, with certainty, entail the conclusion (Q then ~G). An example would
be a pocket full of change. A coin is removed three times, and each time the coin is a nickel.
Therefore, all of the change in the pocket are nickels. A nickel was indeed removed from the
pocket on three occasions, but that does not mean with certainty that the change in the pocket is
nickels. The second step, deductive (Q to ~G), is based on a faulty premise P, or at a minimum,
not certain which is necessary for the inferential move from Q to ~G. Rowe acknowledges this
potential and seeks to clarify his intent.
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Rowe engages two specific refutations in clarifying his intent with P. One refutation
lies in what he terms a conjunctive good,187 the other in the move from P to Q inductively. The
conjunctive or conjunction is that of the concession that there is at least one good for E1 (the
fawn) and E2 (Sue) that we know of, which would nullify P. Rowe further deduces that this good
must be actual rather than not.188 Rowe emphasizes the actuality of a known good and that if this
good were not to occur, then P would be true. The inductive move lies in this good not being
actually based on God not existing (~G).189 Rowe opines that God not existing makes P true thus,
the argument sound. This seems question-begging in that Rowe’s statement about the truth of
God’s inexistence making P true would amount to the negation of God’s existence, the
prerequisite of the argument. It would be like: ~G, P, therefore Q. The confirmation bias of
Rowe’s position overshadows the argument placing an undue emphasis on the truthfulness of P.
In either engagement, the soundness of P or the inductive move from P to Q is not warranted.
The force of the argument is compounded through the probability factor.
Rowe introduces the Bayesian calculus in an attempt at equity where numeric values are
given to the premises, including known evils that calculate the end product, giving the
mathematical probability that God does not exist or that this probability is low. The equity is
noted as a “level playing field.”190 The leveling agent is predicated on the assessment and
assignment of the numeric value of 0.5 for existence and, in the same manner, 0.5 for God’s
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nonexistence.191 The formula Rowe uses for this is Pr(G/K) and Pr(~G/K), each having a value
of 0.5, which negates the emphasis of k (known evils in the world) for or against the existence of
God. This is based on what Rowe believes is in agreement between theists and nontheists and an
attempt not to question beg, or foster a presuppositional conclusion for the nonexistence of
God.192 The specific refutation of this model will be undertaken in a following section. Still, it
should be noted that the equation brings value only to the evils in the world as they impact the
end function of God not existing. Rowe acknowledges the positive aspects or evidence for God’s
existence but negates the use of said evidence in the equation.193 Foregoing the tediousness of the
Bayes formula, the product of the probability ensuing from the calculation is that the likelihood
of God existing is .333, which leaves a margin of nonexistence at 2/3, affirming P.194 This for
Rowe is enough. But some aspects are lacking or absent from this calculation and Rowe’s other
arguments. These arguments have been refuted epistemically, mathematically, and through the
exposure of the confirmation bias exhibited by Rowe in the premises of his arguments.
Refutations of Rowe’s Evidential Arguments from Evil
The literary list of refutations is as long as the list of evidential arguments from evil. No
space here would permit an exhaustive exposition of such a list in this capacity. Therefore, what
follows here is an abbreviated journey of what may be considered the top tier of refutations; the
responses to Rowe’s arguments that have fostered the most, or a large portion of the captivating
essence from which subsequent denials have flowed. A brief cursory look at several authors will
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give a balance, or better a counterbalance, to the evidential argument from evil. Philosophers and
theologians such as Stephen Wykstra and Alvin Plantinga have laid foundational work for
contemporary offerings from Jeff Jordan and Kenneth Pearce. Here in these halls, the refutations
excel in the denial of the arguments against God from evidential evil.
Wykstra and CORNEA
One particular point of contention in all of Rowe’s arguments is the perceived acceptance
of the first proposition or premise, which relates to not seeing or having knowledge of a good or
a reason for the permission of evil in the world. This premise hangs on intense or gratuitous evil,
but for brevity, here, these references will be noted as evil. In the refutation of Wykstra, he
concentrates on the use of CORNEA. This is an epistemic condition, as Wykstra denotes the
acronym as “the Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access.”195 This, according to Wykstra, is a
condition of the difference between necessary and sufficient.196 This leads to the lack of
entitlement of saying there are no reasons or there is no appearance of a reason for the various
perceived evils. Wykstra gives three examples in section 3.1: 1) a hanger like building filled with
clutter such as vehicles, construction equipment, and the like, with the intent to locate a table but
not seeing a table; 2) the determination of soured milk while enduring a head cold which detracts
the olfactory ability to smell sour milk which impairs the ability to determine sourness; 3) a Dean
at college ruminates on granting tenure to a young philosopher, while the Dean has no
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experience in philosophy he determines the awarding of said tenure on a few sentences offered
about a topic he does not understand.197
These examples are given in refutation of the principle of credulity, this being what is
observed is likely what is.198 It is curious that when looking at these instances posed by Wykstra,
each has a blinder. The first is blinded by the inability to see everything in the room clearly. The
second affirms the belief of soured milk with a head cold and diminished, if not eliminated,
capacity to smell odors. And the third is a judgment made from a position of ignorance of the
topic. Each requires a response, and each has a hindrance that negatively impacts the outcome. In
applying this to Rowe’s argument of appearance or no known reason, what blinder hinders
Rowe’s acquisition of the entitlement to make the claim? As is posed here, Rowe’s hindrance is
his presupposition that God does not exist. His confirmation bias triggers him to say there is no
known reason or the lack of the appearance of a reason for the evil in the world. Here CORNEA
is applied to Rowe’s argument.
If understood correctly, CORNEA beckons that the position of knowing something does
not necessarily lie in cognitive ability, “what we can’t see (p.143) can’t hurt your theory, so long
as it’s something you shouldn’t expect to see even if it’s there,”199 more still, a connection. Three
parts exemplify this culmination, inclination, cognition of situation, and evidential connection.200
As is argued, the premise of Rowe with “appears” is based on the first two pieces mentioned here
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and that CORNEA adds the “connective” condition, which would allow the entitlement of such a
statement. It is here that what is needed is lacking. The evidential connection is, in part, based on
positioning, mentally, physically, and existentially. There are things beyond our ken not solely
based on cognitive ability but in other physical and metaphysical applications that we may be
lacking in various situations. Such a situation would be the appearance of no know goods which
justify an evil. Just as with the examples given of the hanger, milk, and tenure, the deciding
nature of what each entailed lacked the evidential connection to justify the entitlement to say
with certainty that something is or was what its purported to be. As this pertains to known goods
which would justify the evil or prevention of something equal or more heinous, the value of the
parts may not outweigh the worth of the whole as they are combinatorial goods.201 It is a
compelling argument by Wykstra that Rowe’s argument fails under this criterion. CORNEA and
the combinatorial goods are different approaches to the same end. The inference that God does
not exist due to the appearance of no reason or known reasons that justify the occurrence of evil
is a faulty point of differentiation. In this measure, Rowe utilizes the probability factor of Bayes
Theorem, which Plantinga refutes.
Plantinga and Degenerative Evidence
Rowe’s use of probability functions in his essay “The Evidential Problem of Evil: A
Second Look” is yet another attempt to demonstrate the inexistence of God, this time through a
mathematical equation. This occasion elicits the engagement of Alvin Plantinga in what is a
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convincing argument against Rowe’s new formula showing the nature of the assignment of value
to be prejudiced, cloaked in the guise of fairness. Plantinga demonstrates this with the same
formula used to show the probability of God’s existence rather than the improbability posed by
Rowe.
From the start of Planting’s discourse, he notes the inconceivability of the value Rowe
assigns the probability of Pr(G/K) or Pr(~G/K) as being 0.5.202 Whereas Rowe asserts this value
is the level playing field, Plantinga cannot see how the value can even be surmised. Given all the
possible states of affairs which would be good, how can this be quantified as a numeric value?
The assessment of these states of affairs is the contention raised against Rowe’s sequence of
arguments about appearance and no known reasons. Plantinga continues positing a stacked deck
against theism by restricting what is only agreed upon by theists and atheists.203 This is a tilting
of the probability in the direction of Rowe’s conclusion that God does not exist, which is the
bias, to begin with, exemplified in Rowe’s disallowance of religious experience as it would raise
the probability of God’s existence in the calculus.204 Plantinga seizes this position by noting that
the denial of Rowe’s P (no good we know of justifies God in permitting E1 or E2) is warranted
by religious perception.205 As this relates to CORNEA or the combinatorial goods, Plantinga is
advancing a more encompassing argument, a broader sample of what is, by removing the
blinders that Rowe is attempting to apply. Plantinga then constructs a counterexample through
the probability calculus, which raises the end quotient in favor of God’s existence to 2/3.
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The premise then reflects that which Rowe disallows, religious experience (although this
is not explicit in Plantinga’s explanation of the new premises but is implicit). This is stated as
such:
P*: Neither E1 nor E2 is such that we know that no known good justifies a perfect being
in permitting it.206
In contrast to Rowe’s premise, this entails God’s existence, thus a higher value of probability. In
this counter-argument, it is established, with similar mechanics, that the basis is the same as
Rowe’s but with an affirmation of the probability of theism being 2/3, which, as arguments go, is
as strong as Rowe’s and as relevant.207 As Plantinga notes, this is an argument from
“degenerative evidence.”208 In simple parlance, if a proposition is supported with evidence and
additional evidence negates the proposition of equal value, the argument is devalued. Therefore,
Rowe’s argument is of little value, if any at all. Jeff Jordan makes a compelling argument
looking at quantitative vs. qualitative values as is pertinent to the Bayesian argument.
Jeff Jordan; a Level Playing Field Indeed
Jeff Jordan appealing to Rowe’s admission of a weak argument209 takes a specific tact
regarding Rowe’s attempt at a level, or fair, playing field. In advancing from a weaker to a
stronger argument, Rowe adopts what Jordan refers to as going from a two-step to a one-step
argument.210 The difference between two and one is in Rowe’s 1988 argument Q is inferred from
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P then ~G. As this is the weakness to which Rowe refers, the one-step, according to Jordan, is P
to ~G. This simplified argument is fueled by the probability assignment of 0.5, which ultimately
yields a quotient of the existence of God being 0.333. Jordan focuses his attention on Rowe’s
intentionality of a level playing field by examining quantitative vs. qualitative values.
The thrust of Jordan’s argument lies in the essence of the level playing field posed by
Rowe. What Jordan initially deduces from this is the impotence of what lies behind the criteria
for what is level. Here, quantitative versus qualitative elements are considered. The boundary
determined by Jordan is that the one-step argument (P to ~G) is quantitative or epistemic based
on non-objective probability selection.211 The assigned probability is by way of reason rather
than an experience to avoid favoritism or bias, thus creating a level playing field. This is likened
to the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, which conceals the initial position from a specific bias.212 The
problem here is that, while such a utopian existence is noble, the overarching issue of bias is so
prevalent in Rowe’s position the attempt to reduce or eliminate bias only intensifies the bias
noted in the elimination of known goods, what Jordan refers to as G-goods,213 or possibly the
religious experience restrictions of what can be considered when affirming or denying P.214
Removing this aspect “loads the dice against theism.”215 If correct, another analogous
referent is CORNEA and epistemic access. The missing ingredient, experiential association,
which Wykstra pointed to, is also what Jordan highlights through the guise of a level playing
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field. Rowe’s initial argument of the appearance of known goods is absent a qualitative
conjunction. It seems Rowe is attempting to keep this conjunction absent in the level playing
field while enabling the same for atheism in P. This, as Jordan sums, would negate P (~P),
which, of course, is disallowed, combined with the disallowance of G-goods (goods involving
God which are actual) eliminates an individual in denying P (~P).216 In other words, the inability
to deny P does not instantiate that P is true, which is the basis of the premise. This causing a
catastrophic failure in the argument. This failure cloaked in the restriction of known goods (Ggoods) would be blocked, therefore unknown to those examining the validity of P.217 The
conclusion is that the guise of a level playing field is not level after all and if even it were the
disallowance of specific information which support known goods is not knowable per P thus the
argument fails soundness.
Conclusion
It stands to reason that arguing from something to nothing is a contradiction of sorts. To
argue something does not exist must entail that that which does not exist exists, or there is no
point in the argument. I say this about the intuitive belief in the supernatural present in infancy.
The childlike faith is present through the early years, only to be uprooted (for some) as they grow
older and take in the various premises against a certain paradigm of belief pertaining to a specific
worldview beginning with something. Here, something to nothing does not negate something;
instead, it instantiates it. In like manner, evil is the privation of good, or for evil to exist, there
must be good from which its existence derives. The arguments posited here by Rowe over his
distinguished career demonstrate the continuous discourse between atheism and theism from
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evidential evil. Refutations seek to expose failures in the arguments, each argument having an
underlying bias. The application of CORNEA, the converse calculus of the Bayesian Theorem,
or the biased “level playing field” is all exposure tools effectively used to isolate the bias. A bias
starts with God’s inexistence and precludes referents to God or goods connected with evil events
or those works by God which prevent equal or greater evils. In this negation of goods, the biases
which seek to eliminate them from the forum are magnified. Here lies the essence of this thesis.
The difficult work is not necessarily identifying the bias but what to do with it once exposed.
This is the task set out in the next and last chapter.
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Chapter Three - Strategy
Introduction
The focus of this chapter is to build the strategy to turn the argument rather than merely
negate it. In context, turn means to show the interlocutor where their position meets incoherence
and introduce evidence that speaks to warranted belief (a contested point by many, specifically
here from Bruce Russell)218 to share the Gospel or, at a minimum, remove obstacles that impair
meaningful conversation about the truthfulness about Christian faith. An exposition of two of
Russell’s more widely known articles will be offered in the following pages.219 These Russellian
arguments cover a broad range of topics within the area of evidential evil. His first argument is
more pointed, with the second encompassing various rebuttal arguments from his interlocutors.
In these arguments, clues to his “background knowledge (bias)” are the key to engagement. The
intent here is to show the bias exhibited in his writings as it pertains to his position that the theist
has not offered evidence to support rebuttal arguments against atheism, specifically evidential
arguments. The first article involves the event of a young girl in Flint, Michigan. Russell
redefines the argument’s premises to what he believes is more sustainable, avoiding Plantinga’s
free will defense. Russel engages CORNEA and proper basic belief (Plantinga), attempting to
illustrate its failure to negate his premises. The second argument opens more doors of
opportunity as Russell engages the argument through its progression of language from Rowe to
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present, skeptical theism, young-earth creationism, warranted belief, and a form of the Bayesian
argument from Swinburne. In each instance, Russel asserts that no evidence supports these
positions. It will be the argument here that there is credible evidence, and such that it exists, so
too does God. The vexing issue then ensues: how does this counterargument allow the removal
of belief obstacles to turn an engagement toward the truth of the Gospel? It is not a single
argument but a cumulative case effort.
The vehicle of this action will be a cumulative approach incorporating orthodox
arguments for the existence of God, traditional logic, philosophy, theology, and discourse with
CSR that will provide the framework for this endeavor and provide the mechanism for a proper
evaluation of Bruce Russell’s position. Ultimately, seeking to show an objective look at what can
be known leads to the existence of the God of the Bible.
Evidential Arguments from Evil: The Long Road
The argument from evil is not new; it has been around for millennia. It has, however,
gained significant momentum in the last two centuries, specifically the previous half-century.
Sharp divisions between the various types of evil have constructed a bifurcated attack against the
existence of God stemming from logical and evidential evil. Specifically, the evidential problem
of evil as it pertains to quantity and a believed gratuitousness. Two arguments from Bruce
Russell will be the focus of this section, “The Persistent Problem of Evil” and “The Problem of
Evil and Replies to Some Important Responses.” The intent is to show the progression of
Russell’s arguments that demonstrate confirmation bias disallowing, or better to say avoiding or
ignoring, the evaluation of evidence that counters his position. The expectation is to isolate the
bias and counter with credible evidence to remove obstacles that hinder belief.
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Tragedy
A 1989 paper offered by Bruce Russell details his argument from evil against God’s
existence through the tragic suffering and death of a young girl from Flint, Michigan. He begins
the conversation by establishing the problematic issue of evil pertaining to adherents of
philosophy and everyday, regular people.220 In this, the debated issue in academia reaches out to
the public to demonstrate that evil affects everyone regardless of convictions for or against the
existence of God. Initially, Russell briefly espouses some basic arguments and abandons them in
leu of various failures within the premises of the arguments.221 Evaluating these first series of
arguments seems to show a progression from logical to evidential arguments, which is partly
why Russell does not progress their position. The first is as follows.
1. If God exists, there would be no evil in the world.
2. But there is evil in the world.
3. Therefore, God does not exist.222
The second.
4. If God exists, then no unnecessary evil exists.
5. Some unnecessary evil exists.
6. Therefore, God does not exist.223
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Lastly, in this section.
7. If God exists, then nothing happens which he should have prevented from happening.
8. If something happens that any human moral agent should have prevented if he knew
about it and could have prevented it without serious risk to himself or others, then
something happens which God should have prevented from happening.
9. Something has happened that any human moral agent should have prevented if he
knew about it and could have prevented it without serious risk to himself or others.
10. Therefore, God does not exist.224
The basis for the progression of these arguments lies in the affirmations and refutations which
Russell utilizes in the actual argument that he proposes. I will briefly critique what he has
offered, as certain aspects will prove helpful in a refutation of his final position.
The first argument demonstrates a logical flair that evil exists so God cannot, but this is
not the focus Russell undertakes. His position of not working specifically from this argument is
that certain goods are corelative to some evils.225 He expands this thought by conceding and
connecting virtues such as compassion, sympathy, heroism, and the like to various evils which
produce them or serve as the platform from which these virtues are realized.226 This is a valid
point that coheres with reality but on a seemingly individual level or point of insertion. I will
expand on this more in a later section. But for now, the virtues Russell speaks to can also be
observed on a corporate level or by a group. In some instances, compassion from a distance, or
further removed from the epicenter of the event, is quite different from what is experienced at the
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core or direct involvement. In each instance, or relational connection, the affected virtue is
slightly different. Nevertheless, Russell does not progress this version of the argument due to this
invalidating response.
Through language, the second argument suggests a positional change, logical to
evidential. The addition of “unnecessary” replaces general evil from the first argument.227 Again,
Russell chooses not to utilize this form of the argument based on the “free will defense,” which
negates premise (4).228 The “free will defense” has been propagated by Plantinga and
successfully refutes the existence of evils and the existence of God together.229 The ability to
choose to do something or not choose to do in the same circumstances is an outweighing good
from that which would result in an evil. Therefore, the argument does not suffice for Russell’s
purposes. This leads to the third argument and its issues.
The third argument advances much different language and perspectives on what this
language entails. It is a shift from general evil and natural, such as the fawn dying in the distant
forest or a natural disaster, to moral evil involving a moral agent. This type of evil is then held in
juxtaposition between what an all-powerful God would do compared to what a human would do
in the same position with the same ability and knowledge.230 There is another subtle progression
of language which differs from the original language in Rowe’s argument, which is “would
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prevent”231 to “should” or “should have prevented.”232 There is a tense change, and the
comparison of what God should have done juxtaposed to what a human agent should have or
could have done. This is a more forceful argument and introduces the “Sue” case. The force of
the argument lies in the use of language coinciding with the tragic events which came about on
New Year’s Day 1986 in Flint, Michigan. Despite the addition of moral evil in the case of “Sue,”
Russell elects to abandon this form of the argument based on a relational issue of God to His
creation of humans.233 Not specifically the “Sue” case but the essence of the relationship which
would be afforded in the general premises offered in the argument. This special relationship of
Creator to created is a negator of premise (8) and is believed to result from Wykstra’s parentchild analogy.234 The fourth and standing argument Russell does advance is the murder of “Sue”
as the event that happened in the third argument. The difference, other than a specific event, is
that it lacks an outweighing good that fosters this event.
“Sue”
“Sue” is the name given to a five-year-old girl who was beaten, raped, strangled, and
murdered on New Year’s Day 1986, killed by her mother’s boyfriend.235 This tragic event is the
foundation for the argument Russell advances where he posits “no outweighing good,” which
justifies this event. His argument is as follows.
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11. If there was no outweighing good that morally justified letting the
little girl in Flint be brutally murdered, then God should have
prevented that murder from happening.
12. There was no outweighing good that morally justified letting the
little girl in Flint be brutally murdered.
13. Therefore, God should have prevented that murder from happening.
14. If God exists, then nothing happens which he should have prevented
from happening.
15. Therefore, God does not exist.
Russell then begins his perusal of the potential defeaters of the argument’s premises. As this is
not a compatibility issue, premises (11) and (14) are not approachable.236 It is not a question as to
the existence of God and evil; instead, it is with the allowance of a given evil and an outweighing
good for that evil to be allowed. Continuing, Russell then engages what he believes to be the
only questionable premise (12). This seems a miss, as the onus of premise (11) is “if” there is no
outweighing good. The word “if” leaves this premise open to some form of scrutiny as it goes to
the inference of (11) to (12), “There was no outweighing good.”237 This same issue plagued
Rowe’s E1 and E2 argument, which many have successfully engaged.238 Wouldn’t this same
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issue plague Russell’s inference from (11) to (12)? A defense to this position lies in the negation
of Russell’s belief that there are no outweighing goods. He posits that there could be
outweighing goods, such as preventing the murder could have had greater issues in other places,
or that her acquisition of complete felicity239 being in the presence of God would hit the mark.240
This, as is criticized by Russell, merely shows the potential or possibility but does not speak to
“are” such goods.241 He is looking for those reasons which are actual rather than possible, but
how does one establish this without having full knowledge of all circumstances of an event
which penetrate the event itself and any corollary events which result? It seems this is not
possible, not in a skeptical theist way, but in a reasonable way. Therefore, the possibility factor
waged from experience is what should suffice. Russell is asking for proof of a negating reason
but offers no proof of his position other than the existence of evil events. He is hampered by the
same constraints as the theist but refuses to concede this allowance. Nevertheless, there are
possible reasons and reasons I would offer as evidence (“are”) of outweighing goods from my
experience in the criminal justice system.
This is a case of good over evil: the ability for what is right to triumph over what is
wrong. Given the “Sue” case, there is no doubt that the responding officers and detectives felt the
victim’s suffering, not in the same physical sense, but without question emotionally through
compassion and sympathy. Russell notes these virtues as having to have the presence of evil for
maturation. This compassion transfers to the investigation to bring justice to the aggrieved
through placing charges and then the proceeding trial. At this point, the attorneys, the courtroom
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personnel, and the jury all wish to serve justice for the loss of life, that evil act of another
perpetrated against, in this case, an innocent. Holding an individual responsible for their actions
is a noble endeavor, which is a good. This vindication of the lost, for those vicariously affected,
is individual and corporate. It is the stance against what is evil; in this case, humanity is rising
against evil, which is an outweighing good. One that is directly connected and distant for those
who know of the event and resulting proceedings.242 The counter to this position could be that
the criminal justice system sometimes gets it wrong through faulty convictions or biased
investigators, which leads to a faulted process. This is true in certain aspects, but the overarching
tenant is that the justice system is good and right. Often, court proceedings do not yield the
outcome expected; the accused are found not guilty, as is the case with “Sue.”243 The communal
effort is one example of an outweighing good; others would be political and war. Looking at the
whole, what would be noted as a combinatorial good is a good that thwarts evil, as is here the
heinous act against “Sue.” This is a moral justification of the allowance of this evil.
Russell stated that (12) is the only approachable premise but that rather than possible
reasons, what must be demonstrated is those reasons which “are.”244 I believe that what has been
produced “are” reasons for the allowance of, at least, this evil. It was true then and continues to
be true now as the case of evil does not subside over time. Therefore, this outweighing good is a
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continuous act of good over evil. It does not follow then that this position is hardly the all-time
end of evidential arguments from evil. Answering a specific event does not entail the same
answer would suffice for all evil events/acts. They must be weighed individually. But it does, I
believe, answer the question of what an active, current, outweighing reason would be, which is
connected to the specific evil committed against “Sue.” Russell quasi deals with this reason in
Section II of his piece.
Objections and Replies
Section II of “The Persistent Problem of Evil” deals with objections and replies. Russell
asserts that what I have presented is false, as there is not enough outweighing good for others
involved to justify the suffering of “Sue.”245 There is some merit to the lack of outweighing
goods if considered on a one-to-one basis. But, as I have suggested, the outweighing good is
broader in scope and encompasses a community. As also offered, the fight against the axis
powers of WW II involved the world in the defeat of this evil. Although I believe this is an
outweighing good, it has its difficulties. It is a dangerous move to begin comparisons of pain and
suffering from one to another, which gathers in a greater force in numbers to stop an evil or bring
justice to an evil done. Russell then progresses to tackle CORNEA.
CORNEA
Russell believes CORNEA to be false based on question-begging. His example is rooted
in the discernable good which would be revealed to us is hinged on the existence of God.246
Suppose this position is question-begging, and the theist needs to argue a position contra God’s
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existence. In that case, the question still stands as to the discernability of an outweighing good
that would likely be revealed. Even in the absence of God’s existence, CORNEA applies and is
successful as the base situation (S) still requires more than is allowable through the principle of
credulity. This principle states that a situation is likely true without defeaters as it is and is a
priori.247 Of course, Swinburne qualifies this principle by investigating (S) further by way of
memory recall or other sensory or perceptual experiences that are filed away in memory.248 By
CORNEA standards, an additional step must be undertaken to establish an appropriate locus for
making a knowledge claim, in this case, an “outweighing good.” That step is an evidential
connection of the inclination to believe (S) and the cognitively understood situation which
instantiates that belief.249 If understood correctly, this evidential connection would be something
standing which is confirmed or defeated by or with external considerations. Wykstra makes this
caveat before critiquing Rowe’s initial argument by CORNEA, and where I use external,
Wykstra uses the word “other.”250 Whereas this critique is pointed at Rowe’s argument, what is
critiqued here by Russell holds the same premise of the knowledge of an “outweighing good.”
The language is different but holds the same onus or force of what is known or reasonably
known to be an outweighing good. As has been argued, an outweighing good (known through
experience and direct knowledge in like instances) is that of the triumph of good over evil. The
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furtherance (maturation) of the virtues exhibited by those directly involved in the “Sue” case
through the investigators, jurors, and court personnel, to right a wrong is a collective good
surpassing the single or the individual. Russell argues against CORNEA by using a logical
fallacy of question-begging. It is a curious response. As Russell applies CORNEA, he offers a
revised premise. It is as follows.
16. On the basis of there being no outweighing good within our ken
served by the relevant suffering, we are entitled to claim "It appears
that the suffering is pointless" only if it is reasonable to believe that,
given our cognitive faculties and the use we have made of them, if the
suffering was not pointless, some outweighing good would likely be
discernible by us.251
Using the consequent of CORNEA, those outweighing goods are beyond our ken (pieces of
information, reasons, or data to support an action or allowance of an action beyond the finite
human mind). Russell inserts this as the antecedent of the premise (16), then argues that no
known outweighing good is discernable to us. It seems as though this is now a circular argument
relying on the inability to know beyond our ken as the very reason why there are no known
outweighing goods. This ignores what lies beyond our ken, of which we have no knowledge,
which is the contingent of CORNEA. But this is what Russell is doing through confirmation
bias, arguing from the presupposition that God does not exist; thus, his premises show this bias.
It is this bias that is to be engaged. If successful, the engagement will pivot on a
modified/expanded CORNEA, which goes beyond cognitive epistemic sense to a sensory
epistemology based on CS/CSR combined with various evidence for God’s existence. This will
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come in a later section of this chapter as the last critique of Russell opens the door to the
expanded argument.
The Problem of Evil: A Continuation with Some Important Responses
In this, Russell’s most recent argument categorizes four moral arguments into one moral
argument and then places his final argument on one premise, that premise being the last.252 The
argument which follows is arranged from least to greatest, as Russell believes is the flow of the
sophistication of each.253
(1A) If God exists, there would be no suffering.
(1B) If God exists, there would be no unnecessary suffering.
(1C) If God exists, he would not allow unnecessary suffering unless
allowing it is needed to bring about a greater good or prevent a greater bad.
(1D) If God exists, he would not allow excessive unnecessary suffering.254
Russell parses out the issues with each of the premises giving a further treatment to 1C and
refutations offered from Van Inwagen.255 Russell reviews Inwagen’s refutations levied on the
boat captain and a judge, with the judge receiving a fair amount of the ink. It is the counterexample of the sentence issued by the judge (be it in incarceration or monetary fines levied as

252
Bruce Russell, “The Problem of Evil and Replies to Some Important Responses,” European Journal for
Philosophy of Religion: Journal of the Central European Society for Philosophy of Religion 10, no. 3 (September 1,
2018), 105, accessed December 2, 2021, www.https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v10i3.2590.
253

Ibid., Russell, “The Problem of Evil and Replies,” 105.

254

Ibid., Russell, 106.

255
Daniel Howard-Snyder, The Evidential Argument from Evil (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1996), accessed December 3, 2021, www.proquestebookcentral.com. Van Inwagen has two chapters in this book (8,
12) dedicated to refutations of the EAE. It is recommended reading as this volume collects papers from participants
on the forefront of this rhetorical area of discourse in one tome.

93

punitive for the committed crime) that I wish to isolate. Specifically, Russell comments that “The
trouble with the examples of the judge and the captain is that they involve finite human
beings.”256 What is at stake here is experience, specifically with the judge analogy. Yes, as a
human, the judge is finite in noetic ability, but what is apparently disallowed by Rowe is the
individual's experience, which adds to the instantiation of an action, belief, or cognitive
acquisition. Assigning 365 days in jail rather than 364 could have pivoted on the judge’s
experience with other like offenses and offenders. Through the judge’s experiences on the bench,
it could be held that the length of incarceration is proportional to the recidivism rate.257 If a more
stringent punishment lessens the recidivism rate, then a great good has been accomplished.258 A
counter-argument is what are the gradient factors of too much? Granted, this ideation’s
parameters exceed this thesis, but the judge's experience must be considered in what would be
construed as excessive or unnecessary punishment. The excessive and unnecessary aspect is
what Russell adopts in his working argument.
Russell settles on an argument from (1D). This argument is:
(1D) If God exists, he would not allow excessive unnecessary suffering.259
This argument is further parsed out as follows.
(1) If God exists, he would not allow excessive unnecessary suffering.
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(2) But there is excessive unnecessary suffering.
(3) Therefore, God does not exist.
The level of sophistication alluded to by Russell must lie in the use or progression of language,
as this is the difference from least sophisticated (1A) to most (1D). This is observed with the
progressive parlance from suffering to unnecessary suffering to excessive, unnecessary suffering.
It is important to note that Russell concedes that God could allow unnecessary suffering, at least
in the counterargument offered by Van Inwagen regarding the judge, as long as it falls within a
certain parameter.260 This concession does not seem to demonstrate an abandonment of the
outweighing good. Still, it does show that there would be instances where God would allow a
degree of suffering above what is necessary in Russell's mind. Therefore, the clause of
“excessive unnecessary” is added to the premises (1 and 2), which presumably takes the place of
the outweighing good. As the basis of the argument seems consistent with other arguments
(beyond language), the question of what determines excessive, unnecessary suffering is apparent.
Is this argument's evil more excessive and unnecessary than previous arguments? If so, what is
the standard of measure for this scale so that all can be aware and proceed with judgments from
the same position? In a recorded presentation for an EPE conference at the University of Notre
Dame, Russell responds to what “excessive” is to accomplish when added to unnecessary. He
simply states that excessive is way more suffering than would be expected.261 This is tantamount
to the outweighing good as the same or similar reasoning behind it is the ability to see a reason
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or, in this case, to understand what is excessive and unnecessary. Russel, in lieu of this, engages
skeptical theism.
Skeptical Theism/CORNEA
Russell’s onslaught of skeptical theism (ST) has a locus in CORNEA, because the same
reasoning adopted by skeptical theists (STs) is that it is not possible to determine what lies
beyond our ken.262 Russell concedes that CORNEA is sufficient in certain instances but does not
offer necessary conditions.263 Russell does not delineate these conditions, so clarity is lacking.
He does provide two examples, each with a different reality, which presumably provides the
necessary conditions he stated were missing from CORNEA. Looking at each example can be
further quantified or qualified. The Matrix or demon world is the first example given of which
Russell says he has no doubt he is not in either of those worlds. This is based on what is
normally conceived from the real world he is actually in.264 His following example is that of
looking for a friend in a restaurant. The friend’s presence is not apparent, so the friend is not
there.265 Because CORNEA does not yield the necessary conditions, it cannot be used as Russell
asserts. Thus, the perlocution of Russell’s unmet conditions rests in what is reasonable to
believe in the absence of not seeing something.266
It seems adding a condition may open avenues of further dialog. Such a condition could
be a sensory connection or an evidential connection, evidential from the point of additional
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sensory acquisition such as feel or a positional change which would allow a greater field of view.
If these conditions can be met, it seems unlikely that the original data (the friend is not there
because I cannot see him) would be incomplete, lacking a positive connection that would yield a
more conclusive answer. This notion is building on NFT as espoused in chapter two. What could
be the answer Russell gives as the friend is not there could be a misrepresentation of what is
understood. The friend may be in the restroom at the time of the observation. Or maybe the
friend dropped an eating utensil and stooped to pick it up, thus removed from the field of view.
The bridge needed is meaning which is part of the necessary condition of naturalistic
functional/teleological theory of mind (NFT).
How is meaning acquired in this example to provide a necessary condition? An
observation is merely data without meaning. This meaning is derived from the representation of
the organism to the world around that organism and how they interact.267 Without the meaning,
what is observed could be sensory deception rather than connection. Russell gave an example of
the barn facade in “The Persistent Problem of Evil.”268 If, when looking at the ninety-nine barns,
it is believed that they are, in fact, barns (although only one is actually a barn), a sensory
connection would complete the notion of what is real from what is a false understanding of the
situation. A change in position can realize this connection; a different angle may provide a better
depth perception of the situation. Another example would be a flat earth instead of the spherical
earth that actually is. Foregoing technology, space flight, and satellite photographs imagine
standing on a plain and looking in any direction. You can only see as far as the horizon. Despite
physical limitations (we can only see so far), if you take a forward step in the direction, you will
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see one step further than you previously had. This is a sensory connection. Rather than saying
after looking in a specific direction, that is all there is (a flat earth), taking that forward step
revealed one more step of ocular and physical information by way of cognition and connection to
the world you are in. For the sake of argument, removing geographical obstacles such as oceans
and mountains and continuing to take forward steps would eventually lead to circumnavigating
the globe, thus establishing that there is something more beyond the horizon (what we see or
what we know present perception). The intent here is to show that, given advances in CS and
CSR, there are necessary conditions that instantiate warranted belief even in incomplete
information or perception. A more detailed treatment of this position will entail in the last
section. Russell’s argument advances to incorporate STs position of a young earth.
Young Earthers/Biblical Creationists
Russell develops his argument from the position of refutation from CORNEA (reasons
beyond our ken) to incorporate the arguments from whom he calls “Young Earthers.”269 The
newly stated argument from this position against a young earth and crossover to EAE goes as
such.
(1*) If Young Earthism is true, then the earth was created recently.
(2*) But the earth was not created recently.
(3*) So Young Earthism is false.270
Russell asserts that YE (Young Earthers) insist that premise (2) cannot be judged accurately
because no position warrants such a stipulation (akin to ST).271 He continues to summarily
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describe all individuals who adhere to a young creation as envisioning what is an intentional
deception by God. The intentionality lies in the apparent long history of the world where people
only believe they have had issues rather than the actuality of having those issues (evil acts).272
This position hardly represents the whole of young-earth creationists. Holding a young-earth
position does not necessitate the belief of deception on the part of God. There are problems with
this position. The entirety of this line of argumentation lies in the presence of evil, and God’s
allowance of it, that God intentionally deceives and places Him in the action of the evil, which is
contrary to orthodox Christian belief.273 The second is if the statement of this world being a
deception were true, it would not be a reality that could be differentiated from virtual existence.
In Russell’s defense, he argues that the base refutation is the same in ST and YE, that being not
in a place to say something is the way it is observed or believed to be per human cognitive
limitations.
This thesis does not allow the scope of evidence comparison from empirical positions to
support a YE or to dialectically engage various scientific positions based on experimentation and
historical science, developing hypotheses from a base of Scripture versus evolution. It suggests
that regardless of position, the evidence available to science is the same for all engaged in the
pursuit of the ontology of all that is observed. The same data lead scientists in vastly different
directions to understand the universe. Beyond the position that the world was created one
hundred years ago or sooner (this does seem out of sorts), the position of a young creation (ten
thousand years or so) is based on hypotheses stemming from the same data (biology, geology,
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etc.) available to mainline scientists, each with a variable starting point. Those points are
physicalism and theism, both having direct bearing here.274 Creation science is termed pseudoscience as it lacks epistemic rigor, as alleged.275 An interesting aspect here is that scientists who
uphold a young creation receive the same level of education and examine the same data but have
different foundational starting points. But those who do not conform or prescribe to “standard
science” are considered pseudo.276 It is important to acknowledge that there is a difference
between empirical and theoretical science and between scientific methodology and the
philosophy of science. This is believed to be the tact taken by Russell, theoretical, which he
continues using the G. E. Moore shift.
Moore Warrant
Section III of Russell’s offering involves the critique of Plantinga, Moon, and Swinburne
viz a vis the G. E. Moore shift. In simple form, the G. E. Moore shift lies in a reversal of a
premise and the conclusion with a negation of the reversed positions. Essentially, by negating the
first premise and the conclusion, Moore says that he does have (or whomever the interlocutor
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might be) reason to believe (God exists).277 Russell seems to be challenging the reasons offered
by the Moore shift as a lack of warrant as stipulated by Plantinga, Moon, and Swinburne.278
Plantinga
Specifically, Plantinga argues for what he calls a “natural knowledge of God.”279 This is
akin to intuition, as has been argued in chapter one from the research and work of Barrett. But it
goes a bit further as the natural knowledge is a combination of what is observed in nature and
humanity bearing the image of God (Rom. 1:19-20; Gen. 1:26). Plantinga quotes John Calvin as
man (humanity) has been “imbued with the conviction that there is a God.”280 This position of
self-seeking a deity is a debate for another venue, but it could be from being created in God’s
image (Gen. 1:26). C. S. Lewis also alludes to this, calling it the “Natural Law.”281 In
juxtaposition to Calvin and Plantinga, where this inner conviction of God is further exemplified
in refusal of His existence, is akin to an apophatic argument for God’s existence from the
negation. Accordingly, argumentation that God does not exist is evidence that He does.
Otherwise, why would there be a need to argue at all? Plantinga refers to this sense as the sensus
divinitatis.282 Russell engages this phrase with a curious comparison.

277

Marilyn M. Adams, and Robert M. Adams, Oxford Readings in Philosophy: The Problem of Evil
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 32, accessed December 7, 2021, Logos.
278

Ibid., Russell, “The Problem of Evil and Replies,” 114.

279
Alvin Plantinga, Knowledge and Christian Belief (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company,
2015), 31, December 7, 2021, Logos.
280

John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion (Bellingham, WA: Logos Bible Software, 1997), I, iii,1,
accessed December 8, 2021, Logos.
281

C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York: Harper Collins, 1980), 3, accessed December 8, 2021,

282

Ibid., Plantinga, Knowledge and Christian Belief, 33.

Kindle.

101

Russell attempts to turn the sensus divinitatis on the notion of a leprechaun, noting it as
sensus leprechaunitis.283 Then seeing something traditionally linked to leprechauns, conclude
that a leprechaun created this thing; therefore, leprechauns exist.284 This is where the expanded
CORNEA would come into play. Establishing a connection of the belief with an external factor
(or more) and how the one holding the belief relates (interacts) to that environment would
solidify the epistemic position giving additional warrant to the belief. Take God and leprechauns
as the examples given. For argument’s sake, a factor that could be examined would be a contrast
between the numbers of people who believe in God against those who believe in leprechauns.
Not surprisingly, the numbers of leprechaun-believing people are not reflective of a
global position. Surprisingly, there is a statistic based on a poll taken in Ireland of people who
believe in leprechauns. This poll conducted by Cooley Distillery in 2011 showed that 33% of
those contacted (people living in Ireland, specifically Louth County) believed in leprechauns.285
The brief article does not give the count of the total number of people polled or other
demographics that would prove beneficial, so this is not a scientific endeavor. But facts can be
surmised as to the population of Louth Co Ireland, which, as of the 2011 census, was counted at
122,897.286 The weight of this data is compromised. It was done in jest, but indeed there are a
portion polled that believe in leprechauns. In contrast to Christianity, or better, those religions
that hold monotheism (Christian, Islam, Judaism) have a more robust calculation based on
census data. A Pew research analysis from 2015 demonstrated that of the world’s 7.3 billion
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population (2015), 2.3 billion were professing Christians.287 Add to that number the remaining
monotheistic religions of Islam and Judaism, 1.8 and .01, respectively, bringing the total number
of believers in God to 4.11 billion.288 These numbers show that monotheistic religions make up
approximately 56% of the global population.
The totality of monotheistic belief can be viewed in contrast to the sensus leprechaunitis
as a vast difference. Additionally, the fact that there are no mechanisms in census calculations to
account for those who believe in leprechauns as opposed to those who believe in God shows that
one is inconsequential. At the same time, the other holds some form of merit and presence. Does
the leprechaun comparison of Russell really hold when looking at the sensus divinitatis from the
global population of those who believe in God? The sheer weight of the numbers of those who
believe bolsters the cognitive mechanism of the sensus divinitatis, or as Baggett and Walls posit,
non-discursive knowledge (intuitive), which wields properly basic belief.289 This expanded
CORNEA gives support to an a priori belief in the existence of God or non-discursive
knowledge. It seems the same reasoning for the knowledge that I am not a brain in a vat, in a
matrix, or created five minutes ago, holds to an extent, circular reasoning if explained away
through discursive knowledge (moving from evidence to a conclusion). The simple way to
understand these examples is through the proper basic belief that they are not true. The axiomatic
presence of these beliefs is such that they do not need evidential or argumentative support.290
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This is believed to be the position advocated by Plantinga viz a vis the sensus divinitatis. Russell
then engages the position of Moon as an additional step in which to defeat the sensus divinitatis.
Moon
As an a priori belief or properly basic belief, the sensus divinitatis is axiomatic. Russell
offers a counterexample of this intuitive belief with Truenorth in opposition to Moon’s
position.291 Truenorth is an individual who has the ability to point north in most any
circumstance.292 As the scenario goes, Truenorth is at a party and engages his ability to always
point north in a contest with other party attendees, being blindfolded and spun in a circle then
told to point north.293 The indicated direction is, of course, correct, but Truenorth has no
justification for this ability. Russell posits that it is counterintuitive that Truenorth believes in
this ability because the source of the ability is unreliable.294 In the example, Truenorth is always
right. This is so with the results at the party and other statements within the scenario.
Questioning the intuitiveness of having the ability is different than questioning the results or how
the result came to be. As the belief goes, knowing a toaster makes toast does not preclude having
to have a working knowledge of how the toaster does this; it just does. Truenorth always being
able to point north does not eliminate the presence of this ability, nor does not having a reliable
source of the ability negate the belief in the ability as the ability shows to be trustworthy. It does
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not follow then that the sensus divinitatis would be defeated based on not being able to explain
the source outside of divine implanting. The last position taken by Russell is with Swinburne.
Swinburne
Bayes theorem is the entrance point to this last section in Russell’s paper. As such, he
begins with the hypothesis of van Gogh and van Faux and who painted more in the van Gogh
style than the other, probabilistically. This play on words essentially says that a given painting
was more likely painted by van Faux based on probabilities than van Gogh.295 It should be noted
that the numbers shown in the example, although fictitious, are known. In contrast to the Bayes
theorem given by Rowe, where the numbers were not derived from a known source, fictitious or
otherwise, they were derived from what they believed could be. Also, lacking some of the
background evidence in favor of God’s existence makes it difficult to determine objectively what
those numbers could actually be. Plantinga managed this aspect of the refutation convincingly.
Therefore, no further treatment will occur with this portion of Russell’s paper. Russell uses the
Bayesian argument to springboard into a broad-spectrum argument against God. This could
possibly be his better argument.
Russell draws attention to what is termed the “God Hypothesis.”296 In this, God created
everything and sustains the universe. According to Russell, this explanation fails due to an
unexplainable event: how does an unembodied entity interact with a physical cosmos?297
According to Russell, this is a mark against the hypothesis, as giving a reason that is impossible

295

Ibid., Russell, “The Problem of Evil and Replies,” 120-121.

296

Ibid., Russell, 123.

297

Ibid., 123.

105

to comprehend does not suffice.298 This is a good point, where special pleading does not yield
truth in a paradigm belonging to a worldview but must be able to explain what it should.299 This
point will be developed in the last section, but for now, attention is needed to set this aspect aside
as it is a key to Russell’s argument at this point. The short answer to this is the incorporeality
doctrine, which explains God’s disembodied existence. But more is needed to engage this
explanation meaningfully. Continuing, Russell requests more evidence, such as a voice, an inner
voice, urging people to do what is right.300
It seems quite clear that this voice exists. It exists as conscience, that inner voice that
speaks to us about a moral law, a way of living which necessitates right action towards people
and the world, the moral law written on the hearts of humanity (Rom. 2:15). Atheists have
submitted that morality is merely a social contract between people.301 This contract or agreement
brings two questions to mind one is mitigation for when the contract is violated, and the second
is from where these moral inclinations come from? What is the locus of what is agreed upon? Is
it that internal voice Russell is asking for which determines right and wrong across ethnic and
cultural divides? Is it a voice heard in the language of one it is speaking to? It seems clear this
voice exists and does so in the way Russell requests. In concluding, Russell turns the discourse
back to pain and suffering as it pertains to animals and people. Foregoing additional criticisms
(as they have been offered earlier in this chapter), one point of mention is the position that there
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is too much suffering to justify the virtues of compassion and sympathy, etc., which are required
for development, and that a lesser amount would accomplish the same end result.302 If this were
the case (a lesser amount), we would have less suffering, at least from a human perspective. But
as Russell posits, there is excessive, unnecessary evil, so an inference is that humanity has not
benefitted from lesser amounts. However, it does not seem as though Russell views this position
in the same way. Similarly, to a judge decreeing a sentence that is considered harsh, that
sentence is based on more factors than the capriciousness of an individual. Comparing this to
humanity, it is clear that moral change and maturation have not increased by lesser forms of pain
and suffering. Free will dictates the actions of moral agents of an egregious nature continue to
occur. What basis in life, at this moment, would suggest that lesser amounts of evil would bring
about the change Russell would like to see? Additionally, how much compassion is shown when
an individual is killed for a belief or other reason on the other side of the world, your country,
state, city, or family? There is a gradation in which the closer an individual is to pain, the more
compassion they develop. This would be of great good in the full maturation of compassion,
sympathy, and empathy, a fullness not realized if observed from a distance. Russell then
concludes his paper.
In his conclusion, Russell ruminates the lengthy journey of arguments for and against
God’s existence. He opines that he hopes his offering is more than a step on the road, leading to
the conclusion that atheism is the better choice.303 This ending statement exhibits the bias Russell
holds that God does not exist. The confirmation bias exhibited by Russell is that of a held belief.
It is not due to an overwhelming counterargument but from the refusal to allow the examination
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of counterevidence to his belief. This is confirmation bias and engaging such is the focus of the
last section.
Strategy: A Cumulative Argument
As noted elsewhere in this thesis, the issue at hand is not necessarily the refutation of the
EAE but the bias exhibited by those that argue from it. As it is here, the confirmation bias of
Bruce Russell is evident in his arguments which seek to ignore credible data in lieu of the
presupposition that God does not exist. The latest treatise of Russell has been critiqued;
therefore, what is offered in this section is an expansion of sorts to broaden the categories
Russell speaks to in his 2018 paper, which he uses to bolster his position of atheism on the face
of evil. The tactic here is to take what has been offered in argumentation and add a defense of the
reason for suffering, address God’s intervention in the cosmos’s affairs, and evaluate Russell’s
position in relation to coherence. This is a cumulative case effort incorporating certain Christian
doctrines regarding the work of God, gathering an understanding of cognition and how this
works intuitively with beliefs, the writings of Wittgenstein, Schaeffer, and Lewis, and
concluding with a Groothian evaluation for coherence. The intent in this last section is to expose
the confirmation bias so that it cannot be ignored, but to the end of which free will is exercised in
the continued nonbelief or objective evaluation of data that leads to belief or the possibility of
such.
Excessive Unnecessary Suffering: A Defense
Over the years of toil on the part of atheism, the EAE has undergone many changes. As
wording and premises are refuted, new arguments emerge with new language. Language not
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intended to be a perversion of the Wittgenstein sort304 but to limit what can be challenged by the
theistic community. An example of this is the argument critiqued here. Moving from unknown
reasons to accentuate the quantity of evil and stress, such as excessive and unnecessary, is
presumably a tact to avoid ST and go after the quantity or amount of evil. Still, there is the
implication of an unknown reason lurking in the premises, possibly background data as alluded
to in the Bayesian form. This is so because of the repeated rehash of this notion throughout
Russell’s argument. A theodicy of sorts has been offered for the allowance of pain, suffering, and
evil in the example of people coming to the aid of a victim (“Sue”) in the investigative and
prosecution portion of that case. A more refined reason or defense could also be time.
It does not follow that for something to be justified (evil), the reason must be known at
the time of the event. This is the onus of ST, as there are circumstances where a reason for
something is unknown at the time but not nonexistent. The counter premise from Wykstra, the
parent-child analogy, is an example of this.305 The noetic disparity between a parent and a onemonth-old is clear but lessens as time goes forward and the infant matures into adulthood. This
means that a parental reason for the allowance of something, whether for an infant, toddler, preteen, or teen, does not preclude that the reason is known at the time but understood later in life.
This is also understood as hindsight. Looking back on something from the past and learning
lessons is a major mode of learning and understanding what is in the present. Therefore, an
unknown reason has the great potential to be known later in the future. It may even be known
generationally in that what escapes the father may be understood by the granddaughter, also to be
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revealed in the next life (1 Cor. 13:12). This would make time the counterbalance of the
unknown reason for the given evil (pain and suffering), and also, the expansion of CORNEA
previously noted.
As stated, meaning (understanding) is established through representation and interaction
with the world being represented.306 The infant has lesser interaction with the world around her,
thus reduced cognitive assimilation of reasons for a given event. This holds true through
maturation, both physically and mentally, until such a time when the now older individual has a
more solid cognition of worldly interaction from which representations are made. The locus,
among other things, is time. The expansion of CORNEA to include time differentials bridges
what would be known to not known yet. Thus, time is a defense against not knowing a specific
reason for a given evil event. Russell also notes issues with God’s intervention in the cosmos,
specifically the world and evil occurrences.
Doctrines of God
The insistence that God should intervene or intervene more in the world’s affairs is a
point made by Russell in his 1989 article;307 an idea also touched on in the 2018 piece.308 In the
case of the former, God’s intervention into the states of affairs of the world is questioned to
include the amount that would be needed to balance the scales. This would be considered a
miracle, which does occur but should be evaluated individually. These occurrences are typically
ignored by atheists or “fall on deaf ears.”309 Russell’s take on God’s intervention (miracles)
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could rest on the same foundation as his not seeing reasons for evils. By this, Russell does not
see a reason and, in like manner, does not see a miracle, so it does not exist in either case. Also,
as there seem to be far more evils in the world than, as Russell would have the reader believe,
goods, Russell posits there is too much evil. He is ignoring the goods that are prevalent in the
world. This is akin to Hume’s argument against miracles, by adding generalities or uniform
occurrence, negating the belief that miracles are possible by the testimony of a natural event.310
Here Hume ignores those miracle claims by way of natural occurrence and not investigating the
claimed miracle. Russell seemingly does the same by ignoring the goods in the world. These
smacks of confirmation bias by denying the alternate data against his position, which could be
special pleading in favor of his position. God does intervene in the world. This is made known
through Scripture and testimony of individuals witnessing and directly involved in said miracles.
It does not mean that every reported miracle is, in fact, a miracle; therefore, rather than
dismissing the claims out of hand, attention should be given to weighing the data for a proper
conclusion. As is with miracles or God’s intervention in the world, Russell questions God’s
ability to even interact with the physical reality.
Working from the God Hypothesis, Russell questions God’s ability to interact with the
physical world as a non-embodied being.311 He further equates this to be a mark against theism
as the proposition of God as Spirit and interacting with the world is impossible to grasp.312 Is this
truly an impossible proposition? Or is it contrary to prior philosophical commitments to
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physicalism or naturalism? The doctrine in question is incorporeality; God is spirit (John 4:24).
For a naturalist, it is understandable to struggle with this position. This issue has raged from
ancient times (Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle) to contemporary settings and the cognitive
revolution discussed in the preceding chapters. Specifically at stake is reductivism, or the
reduction of the mind to a physical state rather than separate from the physical brain. This can be
encapsulated in the mind/body dualism, which seems less favorable in contemporary discourse
but is undergoing somewhat of a resurrection.313 The difference lies between philosophical
anthropology and theistic anthropology, and of course, if it is established that the mind is
separate from the body, the incorporeality of God is defensible.314 Substance dualism,
naturalism, physicalism, and the various forms associated with each are vast topics that cannot fit
in this restricted space. Suffice to say, Russell’s difficulties do not lie in the incomprehensibility
of the doctrine of incorporeality. Instead, it is directly contrary to his philosophical commitment
to physicalism. Therefore, it is denied as an applicable proposition by way of confirmation bias,
not the inability to grasp the subject matter. This bias acts as a roof or shield for the objective
perusal of data for God’s existence and thus the subject of the cumulative case.
Theistic Belief, EAE, and Impossibility
Russell stated that believing in the incorporeal God of the Bible is impossible to grasp.315
As such, his appeal to physicalism is more sensible. Is it? The universe’s expansion discovered
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by Edwin Hubble in the 1920s suggests the universe had a beginning.316 The Kalam
Cosmological argument birthed from medieval Islamic Scholasticism posits a transcendent cause
outside of matter which brought the universe into existence, hence a beginning.317 This
beginning was solidified by the universe’s expansion, as is noted in modern cosmology. In the
beginning, God created the heavens and the earth (Gen. 1:1). Here, it can be observed that what
was known in antiquity was known through special revelation of Scripture. Thus, Scripture was
at one point considered the “queen of the sciences.” 318 Scripture is a starting point from which
understanding the world has a terminus a quo. Aquinas made such claims giving the term (Queen
of the Sciences) to theology.319 Theology, Scripture, was the proving board for what could be
known (Eccl. 3:22, 25). Additionally, all knowledge begins with a fear of God (Prov. 9:10). Not
a fear in the sense of fright but from reverent respect. The teleological argument (finetuning) is
another theologically based endeavor.
Looking at the cosmos, our world, and the observed intricacy suggests a designer. As
with the Hubble constant for speed estimation of the expansion of the cosmos, this too is factored
into the design, otherwise scientists would not be able to use it for measurement. This is merely
one example. Others would be the tilt and distance of the earth from the sun. More or less would
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result in the inability, impossibility, for life to exist. Scripture notes the creation in Genesis 1-2,
Isaiah 45:18 teaches that the world was created to be inhabited. This is precisely what is found in
the natural sciences. Given the precision present in the cosmos, it seems irrational to hold to a
physicalist or naturalist position. Random acts, chance, and time do not seem to support what is
observed in nature or advocated by Darwinism.320 It is also understood that there are
counterexamples to these positions. Needless to say, what is has a cause, and to avoid an infinite
regress of causes, the first cause must be transcendent; the God of the Bible. As these are
observations of the world, it is understood that such observations are begotten from cognition.
Thus, they are manifested or verbalized through language and praxis.
Cognitive Science, Cognitive Science of Religion, and Intuition
The work of Barrett and Kahneman has discovered much about how beliefs form through
cognition and intuition. The two-system paradigm focuses on fast and slow, and intuition and
reasoning.321 Intuition is especially being used in determining agent causality. Looking at the
stars, planets, or a mountain range suggests agency, one where human action will not do.322 The
counter to this is that science has progressed to help us understand what we are looking at;
therefore, there is no need to assign agent causality. Natural processes over eons of time have
produced what is observed. This position, naturalism, is unconvincing as it does not tell why
these things exist, their teleologic nature, or the meaning they have to those who gaze upon them
or purpose beyond mere existence. In the shadow of this absence is the intuition of agency,
which far surpasses what a human or humans can do. Religious belief has been found in all
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cultures from all parts of the globe throughout history.323 An influence on religious beliefs,
specifically Christian, is related to prior philosophical commitments such as dualism or
physicalism/naturalism.324 This prior commitment produces biases that affect evaluative
measures when engaging complex topics or, as in the case of the EAE, evidence, and arguments
that propose God or His inexistence.
One aspect alluded to is the mind/body issue and conscience. It seems that to speak of
suffering requires reflection. Such reflection goes beyond a physicalist perspective of the mind in
that cognitive faculty produced as a product of brain function would work primarily to ensure
survival.325 The reliability of such faculties seems counterintuitive. But an innate, intuitive belief
in God (or a god that exists and is responsible for the cosmos) lies in the nature of humans.326
This embedded inclination to believe in God is the sensus divinitatis. This sense of the divine is
manifest in looking at all there is and intuitively knowing that something created it. The heavens
declare the work of His hands (Ps. 19:1) is precisely what comes to mind when one looks at the
stars. The innate, intuitive belief in a creator is triggered in connection with the purpose for that
which is observed. This is reason and reflection of the world, which is observed, as with the
NFT, not merely being in the world but also the connection through cognitive faculties which
necessitate growth. This surpasses mere survival to progress toward a connection beyond the
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physical.327 This, seated in mind, is the connection to our creator. Rather than look at nature and
see it as a material substance, it has meaning beyond matter. Scripture states that God created
everything and mandated that humanity have governance over the creation (Gen. 1:1-26).
Therefore, the rational mind fits within the framework of a rational world; a rational being
creates this world in a way that the mind can comprehend what is observed and go beyond the
mere existence (NFT) to engage the one who created it.328 This represents breaking free from
societal, academic, or philosophical constraints of commitment to look beyond the physical
nature of what is observed.
Coherence
The argument thus far seeks to demonstrate the coherence of belief in God through
cognition, intuition, and the innate draw present in humanity towards deity (specifically the God
of the Bible), which suggests that the interest or religiosity is natural through human perception
and cognition.329 This seems counterintuitive for the naturalist, but when a further connection is
sought, a coherence comes to bear, surpassing the physical to explain why and the relation to the
why. In one way or another, the writings of Wittgenstein, Schaeffer, and Lewis attest to this
coherence through what is naturally perceived, rooves constructed to shield differing conclusions
and the innate notion that there is an omnicompetent God. They are efforts to engage those
mechanisms which work to thwart the natural inclination through perception and cognition to
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accept this coherence to reality. Groothuis interacts with worldview evaluations to determine
coherence, testing the viability of a worldview. Rather than evaluate physicalism/naturalism, the
intent here is to return to the EAE to assess it against what has been offered for coherence to
what is observed perceptually, intuitively, and cognitively.
The Groothian system is designed to be used for worldview evaluation. The EAE is not a
worldview as it only seeks to further one area of thought about humanity and the world.
Therefore, it is better to hold the EAE as a paradigm, a smaller portion within a larger view.
However, various aspects of the evaluative system can be waged against this paradigm to
determine coherence. The following criteria will serve in this evaluation 1) consistency, 2)
coherence of propositions, and 3) the establishment of factual claims.330
The first, consistency, is applied to Russell’s second premise regarding excessive,
unnecessary suffering. Arguments have been given here in two forms, the quasi theodicy (those
coming to aid the victim and those affected by the criminal event) and a defense with expanded
CORNEA (time). When observed through these counterarguments, the question of the
consistency between excessive and unnecessary suffering speaks to inconsistency. This does not
suggest there is no suffering; instead, the suffering born through the world is not superfluous
and, therefore, not excessive, unnecessary from the standpoint of having a reason to allow the
suffering. The “roof” analogous to Schaeffer’s writings suggests a shield from
counterevidence.331 This shield is arguably the fact that combinatorial goods or goods, in general,
are not allowed or reflected upon when considering the evils in the world. As it is presented, the
reader feels that the only thing exists are evils. This, combined with the counterargument here,
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shows inconsistency with Russell’s argument’s second premise and is related to the following
criterion.
The second criterion is the coherence of proposition. This criterion wages the coherence
of all three premises of Russell.
(1) If God exists, he would not allow excessive unnecessary suffering.
(2) But there is excessive unnecessary suffering.
(3) Therefore, God does not exist
The thrust of the later sections of this thesis alludes to God’s existence through cognition,
intuition, and the innate belief that there is a God. The focal point Lewis makes in much of his
writing is what he terms the curiousness of the “Natural Law,” that men intuitively know they
are to act in certain ways.332 This innate knowledge, the metaphysical subject (as it pertains here)
of Wittgenstein, is such that it makes sense in conjunction that God exists. Looking at what is
observed in nature may be explained mechanically, but metaphysics suggests a causal agent that
surpasses humanity, the God of the Bible (Exod. 3:14). Refusing to allow this aspect within the
argument only evaluates half of the situation. This speaks to the third criterion of establishing
factual claims.
Establishing factual sufficiency is a marker of truthfulness. It has been argued here, and
elsewhere, that what is posited by Russell and others does not incorporate all there is on the
matter.333 From Rowe to Russell, the intent to limit aspects behind the theistic position places a
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Ibid., Lewis, Mere Christianity, 3.
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This has been demonstrated through the work of Plantings, Jordan, Wykstra, and Martin to name a few.
What is missing is the other side of the equation, the goods.
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lopsidedness on the arguments,334 thus tilting the argument from the first premise in favor of
atheism. This is the manifestation of confirmation bias by eliminating the argument's potential
counterevidence, thus upholding the individual belief against God’s existence. It is in these
criteria that Russell’s argument fails.
Conclusion
This has been a long chapter covering much ground. It does not instantiate the failure of
the EAE or death knell but works to expose the confirmation bias which undergirds the premises.
The progression of the arguments of the past half-century elucidates the unwillingness to fairly
evaluate any evidence contrary to the atheistic position. Such positions as time with expanded
CORNEA show the truth of understanding a reason for an evil well after the particular evil has
faded into history. Continuing advances in CS and CSR work to understand religious belief and
bolster the intuitive nature of belief in God. Being created in God’s image (Gen. 1:26) is the
connective link with the sensus divinitatis, which triggers a priori belief in God as it is akin to
the metaphysical subject needing no justification, not in the sense of a brute fact, but in
conjunction to a cumulative case for God. Given this parlance, the intent is not to thwart or
render a death blow to the EAE but to show the coherence of belief in God with reality
surpassing the physical mechanics to the way to share the truth of Christ.

334

Ibid., Howard-Snyder, 266 and Ibid., Russell, 106. It is the contention that both these men acknowledge
the positive arguments from theists against EAE but disallow those positive inputs such as religious experience and
the cogency of previous theistic arguments.

119

Thesis Conclusion/Results
The problem of evil does seem to be a problem. But for whom? The atheist observes the
suffering in the world as gratuitous or excessive, and unnecessary. This postulates that there is no
God, or these sufferings would not be as they are. Despite the concession that some evils are
necessary for virtue and ethical maturation, the mission to refute God’s existence continues. It is
an all-or-nothing proposition espousing all the evil in the world and its volume but not noting
any of the good. Evidence for God’s existence is beckoned for, and then when offered, such
evidence is ignored or disallowed. It seems preposterous to require such expectations and then
impose limits on what can be provided. This weighs on the EAE in understanding the reason for
the evils in the world. This understanding compares finite, limited humanity in juxtaposition to
an omnicompetent God. Orthodox Christianity holds that humans are made in and with the
image of God. The image of God provides a means of intellect, rationality, and self-reflection.
Additionally, the sensus divinitatis gives an innate notion that there is a God, a specific God who
is the creator of everything and unlike anything else (Isa. 46:9).
It would be an easier pursuit to dismiss this innate connection to the Divine if it were
isolated cases or a diminished account of this occurrence. But it is not. Taking a strand from
Hume’s position in miracles which he postulates need to be uniform, the presence of the sensus
divinitatis is precisely that and is observed in cultures across time and distance. The flaw in the
draw of this sense to the one true God is the brokenness of man (Isa. 53:6). This brokenness is
the bedrock of the EAE, as has been argued throughout this paper.
The argument began with a discourse on CS and CSR. Specifically with the formation of
religious belief. CS and CSR are young in the vast landscape of scientific exploration with its
own challenges. One such challenge is the mind/body problem. The dualist perspective was
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demonstrated in antiquity and contemporary times and is a growing issue with the rise of
physicalism/naturalism. This study area has beckoned philosophers for answers for millennia and
will likely continue to do so. The psychology of today was the philosophy of the past. Still
seeking answers to the difficult questions of ontology, intuition, and innate knowledge, which
surpasses survival instincts. It is a condition shared with no other creature setting humanity apart
from everything else in life and death (1 Cor. 15:39; Eccl. 3:21). Being created in this manner
fosters the intuitive knowledge that there is a God and then seeking Him out (Prov. 8:17). The
interaction with cognitive studies and the history which brought it into modernity is the basis of
understanding the EAE.
From the dawn of humanity, the POE has been traced to ancient Greece and Epicurus.
The answer then is the same as it is now. Today’s technology is vastly different, but the nature of
humanity was no better then than now. Humans are the constant and thus hold a particular
position in propagating evil in the world. But evil is not all there is, although atheists would have
you believe such. With ancient roots, the work of Rowe laid the foundation for the modern
parlance of the EAE, postulating the inexistence of God by way of the existence of evil in the
world. The engagement of theodicies and defenses against the EAE have proven formidable in
the battle for the soul of humanity. The latest offering from Russell seems to be an attempt to
side-step the reason for evil, looking more at the quantity or amount present in the world. As
demonstrated, this is a one-sided argument as it disallows the weight of the good in the world.
But the unspoken question remains why?
In the case of “Sue,” a quasi-theodicy was given forming in the criminal justice system,
which fought for justice in the case. Additionally, the defense of time was offered. Time being
the great equalizer sets things straight and allows for additional gained knowledge, which often
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cannot be gathered or comprehended when a specific event occurs. This hindsight allows for an
objective review of a situation and also being able to see from a perspective not available at the
time. It is in this hindsight that more complete knowledge can be had. This is interesting as it
pertains to the yearning for God to intervene in the evil states of affairs (more so than He already
does through miracles) but looking back in time, it does not seem as though humans truly learn
from past behavior. This, and understanding that God does intervene, would not seem to have the
positive effect that Russell posits. This is due to the brokenness of humanity, the will to do the
bad. It is known to be bad from the “Natural Law” innate to all people (with properly functioning
cognition).
This “Natural Law” is an a priori notion of a way of existence. Akin to the metaphysical
subject of Wittgenstein, it is without the need for justification. Not in the sense of a brute fact as
this innateness is felt rather than observed (Rom. 2:15). Evaluating Russell’s argument using
aspects of Groothuis’ worldview evaluation exposes a break from the coherence to reality. Not in
as much from faulty logic but tainted processes due to confirmation bias. This bias is observed in
Hume with uniformity and Rowe and Russell with the disallowance of goods levied in the EAE.
This confirmation bias is in part created from prior philosophical commitments and through
presuppositions against God’s existence. Bias is the portion of the mind and soul that works
towards good and evil. Everyone has a bias; most have many, which guide their understanding of
the world and how an individual connects to that world. Bias is the terminus a quo of a
worldview that can be observed in scientists educated and accredited in the same bastions of
higher education but coming to vastly different conclusions to the same evidence. This is a
bulwark of bias. A presupposition, a philosophical commitment, which guides and inhibits the
objective review of data. Looking at Russell’s latest paper, the bias is pronounced and refuted as
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not coherent to the world, even with aspects counterintuitive to what is expected to be observed
in cognition and the scientific method. The outcome of the success of this thesis is more than
words or argumentation. Its loci depend on the truth of life and existence, tainted through bias.
This thesis worked to specify the ontology of bias as a worldview engine pertaining to the
POE/EAE and address this bias to determine the incoherence to reality to instantiate warranted
belief in God’s existence. I believe the tact employed here successfully identifies the
confirmation bias exhibited by Russell and others and shows this position to be contrary in
coherence to what is real in the cosmos. This is when a held belief should be released in favor of
the coherent paradigm. Acquiescence to God’s existence does not mean placing faith in Him for
life and salvation, it is only the acceptance that He does exist. This is the complex portion as
changing a belief is up to the individual. The ultimate goal of this research is yet to be realized in
that individuals may draw nearer to God.
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